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ABSTRACT 
Mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) volume has considerably increased 
during the last decades, and it has changed the way we manage companies. The present 
dissertation is dedicated to study M&A impact on acquiring firms’ value. Our sample 
includes all acquiring companies that have merged or acquired a Portuguese company 
since 1997 to 2015. The study aims to clarify which factors affect acquiring 
shareholders’ returns when investing in the Portuguese market. The research includes 
listed and unlisted target companies, in order to reflect relevant and diversified M&A 
activity occurred in Portugal.  
We consider that this study contributes significantly to the lack of M&A research 
regarding the Portuguese market. M&A deals are important for small economies such as 
Portugal, however previous literature is mainly confined to the UK and USA, and 
consequently it is difficult to interpret M&A value creation in the Portuguese market.  
In order to examine acquiring shareholders’ wealth we conduct an event study. Our 
findings show that acquiring companies of Portuguese targets do not create or destroy 
value. The difference between acquiring shareholders’ abnormal returns of foreign and 
domestic acquirers is insignificant. Considering the context of the M&A deal, the target 
legal status, the industry relatedness and the culture are irrelevant factors to the success 
of transactions with Portuguese targets.  On the other hand, the payment method and the 
initial stake influence acquirers’ gains.  
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been intensively 
analysed in different perspectives. Indeed, they produce a significant impact on the 
acquiring and target firms, affecting different areas such as human resources, marketing, 
and finance. Nonetheless, after several researches have analysed the impact of M&A on 
value creation (Campa and Hernando, 2004), there is still a high failure rate (Cartwright 
and Schoenberg, 2006). We consider that M&A literature has to be continually 
upgraded with new and relevant contributions, in order to better understand the 
complexity of this theme and improve companies’ decisions.  
M&A have an unquestionable role in the economy. Domestic M&A allow growing 
companies to increase its position in the national market. To compete in international 
markets, companies may need more volume of products or services. During the last 
decades, mergers and acquisitions have become a common choice for companies that 
want to explore cross-border markets (Teerikangas and Very, 2006).  
Domestic and international M&As are very important transactions to a small and 
opened economy as Portugal. Nevertheless, there are few researches concerning the 
M&A market in Portugal (Oliveira, 2004). Actually, before the last M&A wave, merger 
activity was concentrated in the US and UK (Gugler et al., 2003). Cross-border studies 
are mainly focused on these two geographic markets (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004).    
Event study is a methodology that supports a significant part of M&A research 
findings. By conducting an event study for mergers and acquisitions, we aim to analyse 
which factors affect the value of companies that invest in the Portuguese market. For 
that purpose, and assuming the stock market is efficient and so the share price 
instantaneously reflect the actual value of future gains/losses, we will focus on the 
acquiring shareholders’ stock change around the announcement date. The questions we 
aim to answer are described below: 
- Does an M&A of a Portuguese firm increase the acquiring shareholders’ 
wealth?  
- Which factors most affect acquiring shareholders’ gains/losses?  
- Are those gains/losses of foreign acquiring companies significantly different 
from domestic bidders’ returns? 
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The Portuguese M&A market does not have a similar volume to the countries 
analysed in relevant articles of the literature, therefore we will consider all deals since 
1997
1
.  
This research is relevant to the M&A since it will contribute to fill some gaps in the 
Portuguese M&A market literature, allowing a better understanding about the dynamics 
of a small M&A market, specifically about the dominant factors influencing value 
creation on this kind of market.  
In the following section, it will be reviewed the most relevant literature in order to 
synthesize the theory that supports our study. The Chapter 3 presents the methodology 
used to measure the abnormal returns, and the sample. Finally, Chapter 4 presents our 
findings and Chapter 5 concludes. 
  
                                                             
1
 M&A occurred in Portugal since 1997 due to the lack of information for previous years in the database 
ZEPHIR. 
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2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
In section 2.1 important definitions and their differences are clarified. In section 2.2 
it is discussed the main methodologies used in the M&A literature, their characteristics 
and problems. Besides, it is presented the findings of similar studies over different 
periods of time and considering different methodologies in order to understand M&A 
value creation and differences between cross-border and domestic M&A. The section 
2.3 resumes the main conclusions regarding the impact of payment method, culture, 
industry relatedness, legal status, and relative size on the shareholders’ returns. After 
this section, the Portuguese M&A market will be analysed. 
 
2.1 – Definition of merger and acquisition  
M&A can be defined in three categories (Ross et al., 2010): merger or 
consolidation; acquisition of assets; acquisitions of stocks.  
Merger stands for transactions where one company acquirers another, including all 
its assets and liabilities. The bidding company offers directly to target’s managers a 
price higher than the target’s market value. Posteriorly, the proposal is approved or 
rejected by target shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Consolidation is similar but 
it is created a new entity, while in a merger the acquiring company preserves its legal 
existence and the target is liquidated. This M&A category implies a joint decision taken 
by both parts.   
Acquisition of assets occurs when the acquiring firm purchases a considerable part 
or all the target firm’s assets. The acquiring firm can offer stock, cash, or a mixed 
payment (combination of stock and cash). On the other hand, acquisition of stock
2
 is a 
different transaction in the sense that the acquiring company buys voting stock, 
generally, directly from the target’s shareholders. It is not required that target’s 
managers agree with the deal and their opposition can increase the costs of the 
acquisition comparing with a merger. Indeed, a formal merger takes place when all the 
stock is purchased.  
 
                                                             
2
 Also called tender offer. 
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2.2 – Research approaches and findings 
M&A activity comes in waves, as a consequence of economic, technological, 
political, regulatory and financial shocks (Martynova et al., 2008). The first wave began 
at 1890’s and ended in 1903. The second wave occurred between 1910s and 1929 and 
the third between 1950s and 1973. The period of the fourth and fifth waves was 
respectively 1981-1989 and 1993-2001. At the beginning of a takeover wave, 
shareholders’ wealth increase, while during and after the peak wave, shareholders’ 
wealth is negatively affected (Moeller et al., 2005). According to Martynova et al. 
(2008), the early successful takeovers are a result of industrial shocks; new synergies 
are generated for the companies involved. In the second half of a takeover wave it is 
emphasized the negative impact of managerial hubris and agency costs. Moeller et al. 
(2005) emphasize that only a few number of acquisitions announcements contribute to 
the huge losses observed in the end of the fifth wave, investors stop believing that 
successive acquisitions made by some firms would create the expected value.  
In the next sections we will present two different performance studies and their 
findings for the European, UK and US M&A market. 
 
2.2.1 – Operating and financial performance studies 
Operating performance study is one of the two main approaches used to analyse 
M&A profitability. These studies analyse changes in acquirers’ performance, 
considering the accounting statements before and after the deal. It is considered that 
when expected gains at the deal announcement are realized, they will affect acquiring 
company’s cash flow, which implies value generation to the firm (Andrade et al., 2001).  
Examples of variables used to detect value creation are net income, return on 
equity/assets, and leverage, among others (Martynova et al., 2008).   
Some operating performance studies compare acquirers’ performance with other 
companies in the same industry. Analysing previous literature, findings are not 
consensual (Sharma and Ho, 2002; Martynova et al., 2006). Nonetheless, according to 
Sharma and Ho (2002) and Martynova et al. (2008), articles that use indicators related 
with cash flow tend to reveal performance improvements, and the contrary to 
performance tests based on earnings. Consequently, the results of operating 
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performance studies are sensible to the type of accounting method
3
. The inconclusive 
results can also be partially explained by the different choices of a peer group, i.e., 
benchmarking (Martynova et al., 2006).  
With a dominant role in the M&A literature, event study methodology allows us to 
investigate the impact on financial performance caused by a certain event. Studying the 
adjustment of stock prices in stock splits, FFJR
4
 (1969) were pioneers in using an event 
study methodology based on the market model (MM). The abnormal return, i.e., the 
economic impact, is the positive or negative difference between actual return and the 
benchmark’s return. According to Bruner (2004), a benchmark should be used to 
exclude the influence of external factors not related with the deal on share price. The 
benchmark can be defined with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or using a large 
market index.  
When conducting an event study, we assume that markets are efficient, i.e., share 
prices always reflect all available information
5
. Thereby, share prices will change when 
new and unexpected information regarding an M&A deal (an event) is revealed. In fact, 
the announcement of the M&A deal brings new information to the market and 
consequently investors review expected future earnings for the companies involved. At 
the announcement, takeover’s expected net present value is expressed in additional 
variations in share price of acquiring and target firms (Martynova, 2011).  
Researchers can use the event study methodology to study M&A abnormal 
performance in the short or long-term. Several methodological problems arise when 
long-term performance is analysed (Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova et al., 2008). 
Examples of concerns are the fact that the statistical relevance of the findings varies 
with the type of benchmark model used
6; and shareholders’ gains are affected by 
different factors in the long-term and it is difficult to isolate the takeover effect (Campa 
and Hernando, 2004). If markets are efficient, abnormal returns may not exist in the 
long-term and as a consequence an analysis over the announcement period covers, on 
average, the total abnormal performance (Franks et al., 1991). 
                                                             
3
Analysing UK takeovers, Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) report a different pattern of profitability 
comparing two periods with distinct accounting methods (1977 to 1984 and 1985 to 1989). The change of 
accounting standards after 1985 had a positive effect on firms’ profitability. 
4
 Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
5
 See Fama (1970) 
6
 See Franks et al. (1991); Higson and Elliott (1998); Frank and Harris (1989) 
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To sum up, the impact on shareholders’ wealth is linked with the stock market 
reaction during the period around the announcement of the M&A deal. According to 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997), it is more effective to use event studies than accounting 
studies, as stock prices are much less manipulated by managers than accounting returns. 
Incremental changes in the stock price are based on the firms’ right value.  
 
2.2.2 – Do mergers and acquisitions create value? 
Value can be created, preserved or destroyed when returns earned are higher, equal, 
or lower than what was required by investors (Bruner, 2004). Therefore, an M&A fails 
when value is destroyed. To better understand the conclusions of important 
contributions to the M&A literature, we analysed operating and financial performance 
studies realized for different waves, considering the US, UK, and European M&A 
market (appendix 1). 
The regulatory environment was completely different between 1910 and 1929 (2
nd
 
wave). Analysing financial performance for this period, bidders’ abnormal returns are 
close to zero in the US market, and negative if it is only considered tender offers (Leeth 
and Borg, 2000).   
Considering M&A realized between 1950 and 1973 (3
rd
 wave), operating and 
financial performance studies report divergent evidence. In the UK and regarding 
financial performance, Frank and Harris (1989) present different findings depending on 
the type of M&A: tender offers have a positive effect on acquiring shareholders’ wealth, 
while mergers produce a negative effect. Hogarty (1970) affirms in his operating study 
that, on average, acquiring companies in US have a worse investment performance than 
other firms of the same industry. But Lev and Mandelker (1972), another operating 
study for the US market, report positive performance for acquiring companies in the 
post-acquisition period.  
After the 3
rd
 wave, the years from 1981 to 1989 represented the 4
th
 wave. For the 
UK and US M&A markets respectively, and analysing financial performance, Higson 
and Elliott (1998) and Morck at al. (1990) use uncommon benchmark models to 
calculate the abnormal returns but both conclude that acquiring companies obtain 
insignificant returns. Similarly, Franks et al. (1991) find small negative abnormal 
returns at the announcement period with the Market Model. Considering the long-term 
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abnormal performance, there are also insignificant returns for tender offers but 
acquiring firms lose with mergers (Agrawal, et al., 1992). Regarding operating 
performance studies for the 4
th
 wave, Sharma and Ho (2002) present an insignificant 
post-acquisition operating performance for deals occurred in Australia during the 4
th
 
wave. For the US market, Healy et al. (1992) report a different finding: acquiring 
companies obtain increases in operating cash flow returns comparing with their 
benchmark, without jeopardizing the long-term sustainability. This finding is positively 
related with the abnormal returns at the announcement period. Therefore, the future 
cash flows to shareholders projected at the announcement were realized (Healy et al., 
1992).  
Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) review previous literature 
before 1981 and 1986 respectively, taking into consideration financial performance 
articles. Their objective was to consolidate evidence of stock prices changes in mergers 
and tender offers, analysing for that purpose the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 waves. According to Jensen 
and Ruback (1983), in regard to mergers, the conclusions of previous researches are 
mixed. Respecting successful tender offers, Jensen and Ruback (1983) state that 
abnormal returns to acquiring firms are positive and significant, while Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989) find a small and, in some cases, a negative effect on shareholders wealth 
at the announcement period.  
Andrade et al. (2001) characterize the period between 1993 and 2001 (5
th
 wave) as 
a “decade of deregulation”, due to the notable influence of deregulation in the M&A 
activity. Campa and Hernando (2004) state that the cost of M&A in the European Union 
(hereafter EU) decreased with the deregulation in economic sectors, the integration of 
industrial activity confined to the national markets, and the listing of large European 
firms that were controlled by national governments. The authors emphasize that this 
process was triggered by the introduction of a single currency and the creation of an 
economic and monetary union. Consequently, the volume of M&A inside the EU 
market has increased considerably after 1998 to 2000, although mostly due to domestic 
transactions (Campa and Hernando, 2004). Indeed, the fifth wave has affected 
particularly European companies as it was the first period when M&A activity reached 
similar levels comparing with US market (Martynova et al., 2008).  
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During the 5
th
 wave, European bidders’ wealth has slightly changed; the abnormal 
returns were positive and significant at the announcement day (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Martynova et al., 2011). On the other hand, Campa and Hernando 
(2004) report insignificant abnormal returns for acquiring firms of non-financial deals in 
the EU over the period 1998 to 2000, which comprises the last years of the 5
th
 wave. 
Regarding operating performance studies, Martynova et al. (2006) find no significant 
changes in performance during the post-acquisition period. The analysed acquiring and 
target companies had a better performance than the median peers of their industries 
before the deal, which may have influenced their decision to realize an acquisition 
(Martynova et al., 2006). Gugler et al. (2003) report that acquiring firms’ sales decrease 
and profits increase significantly during the post-merger period. This conclusion is valid 
for the different world regions analysed. 
Moeller’s et al. (2004) and Andrade et al. (2001) elaborate financial performance 
studies that analyse the 4
th
 and 5
th
 wave in the US market. The first article considers 
M&A deals while Andrade et al. (2001) investigate mergers performance. Moeller’s et 
al. (2004) state that acquiring shareholders of public companies significantly gain with 
the transaction at the announcement period. On the other hand, the same authors report 
insignificant and close to zero long-term returns. In contrary, Andrade et al. (2001) find 
negative returns to acquiring shareholders in mergers but the results are not statistically 
substantial.  
To sum up, previous literature is not consensual regarding the impact of 
acquisitions on firms’ operating performance (Sharma and Ho, 2002; Martynova et al., 
2006). In fact, these studies are vulnerable to the accounting system. Considering the 
financial performance studies, the findings are also not consensual. However, it is 
possible to affirm that until the 4
th
 wave, in general, M&A had an insignificant impact 
on acquiring firms’ value and during the 5th value some authors report value creation at 
the announcement period. Additionally, mergers seem to produce a negative impact on 
acquirers’ gains, while tender offers have a close to zero/positive abnormal 
performance.  
As a final remark it is important to retain that target shareholders’ returns are 
significantly higher than acquiring shareholders’ (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; and Jarrell 
and Poulsen, 1989). Differences in relative size of the target and bidder firm (when the 
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target is relatively small), regulatory changes and high competition between bidders are 
factors that diminish acquiring shareholders’ wealth (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). In fact, 
Andrade et al. (2001) affirm that announcement gains may be totally captured by target 
shareholders. 
 
2.2.3 – Cross-border versus domestic M&A  
Some operating and financial performance studies are focused on the impact of 
cross-border deals in acquiring companies’ value (appendix 2). Indeed, we can separate 
a certain sample of mergers and acquisitions in transactions limited to the national 
borders - domestic deals, or transactions that involve firms from different economies - 
cross-border deals.  
Cross-border M&A and Greenfield investments are the two main types of Foreign 
Direct Investment (hereafter FDI). Following the OECD
7
 definition, FDI results from 
the interest of a direct investor in an entity of another economy. This interest should 
imply at least the ownership of 10% of the target entity. According to Rodrigues (2009), 
international M&A have a negative effect on economic growth of developing countries, 
while there is no impact on economic growth of developed countries. In 2014, cross-
border M&A increased 66% for non-developed economies, while their value increased 
16% in developed economies (UNCTAD, 2015)
8
. 
After 1993 (the beginning of the 5
th
 wave), cross-border deals represented 23% of 
European deals, while in the end of the 5
th
 wave this percentage raised to 32% 
(Martynova et al., 2011). Although cross-border activity has increased, the 
predominance of domestic bids in Europe is emphasized by Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004): 63% of large deals are domestic. In fact, some barriers were still harming the 
cross-border M&A activity in the EU, as well as the regulatory differences between 
members and the strong governmental control over large M&A (Campa and Hernando, 
2004). The 5
th
 wave was also a period of increase in cross-border M&A activity for US 
acquirers due to a decrease in Greenfield investments and the growth in international 
financial markets (Francis et al., 2008).   
                                                             
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
8 World Investment Report 2015, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
10 
 
Due to the proportion of cross-border deals to domestic deals before 1993, we 
consider that it is only relevant to examine cross-border literature after the 4
th
 wave. 
Hence, bearing in mind the period between 1993 and 2001 (5
th
 wave) and the financial 
performance analyses, we present below evidence reported to the European and US 
market. 
 Regarding positive findings, Martynova et al. (2011) present a positive effect of 
cross-border and domestic deals on European acquirers’ abnormal performance at the 
announcement day, wherein cross-border returns are lower. Campa and Hernando 
(2004) also present lower abnormal returns for cross-border M&A realized in the EU.  
In contrast, the results of Martynova et al. (2011) in the post-acquisition period 
show that cross-border and domestic M&A do not create value. Doukas and Travlos 
(1988) also find insignificant abnormal returns for US acquirers in cross-border 
announcements, the expected benefits of exploring foreign markets are lower than the 
costs. However, the authors state that acquiring companies obtain a positive abnormal 
performance when they were not already operating in the target country.  
Notwithstanding, some authors report divergences between the performance of 
cross-border and domestic bidders. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) state that European 
acquirers earn positive and significant abnormal returns in cross-border deals, whereas 
in domestic deals abnormal returns are negative and insignificant. On the other hand, 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) state that domestic acquirers have a better financial 
and operating performance than foreign acquirers. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) 
and Francis et al. (2008) find a negative cross-border effect for US acquiring companies 
in the first half of the 5
th
 wave. In contrast, Francis et al. (2008) show that cross-border 
effect is insignificant from 1996 to 2003.  
Now, considering operating performance studies, Gugler et al. (2003) conclude that 
there are not relevant differences between domestic and cross-border deals for M&A 
deals around the world in the post-acquisition period. For both types of M&A, sales are 
negatively affected and profits do not suffer significant impacts. The conclusions are 
different for Martynova et al. (2006): European combined firms’ profitability is 
negative in cross-border M&A, and positive in domestic M&A. This difference is 
relevant in economic terms. 
11 
 
Concluding, cross-border M&A volume started to be relevant in the 5
th
 wave. The 
several studies analysed do not present the same conclusion regarding value creation. 
Nonetheless, acquirers’ abnormal performance is correlated with the operating 
performance (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Rossi and Volpin (2004) highlight the 
importance of bilateral trade for cross-border activity. We expect that cross-borders 
M&A of Portuguese targets are frequently conducted by a European acquirer. 
Nevertheless, as there are still regulation barriers between EU members (Campa and 
Hernando, 2004), we expect that cross-border acquisitions of Portuguese targets by a 
European acquirer have an insignificant or negative impact on value creation. 
 
2.3 – Determinants of acquiring shareholders’ gains 
The acquirers’ earnings are not easy to explain as they can be influenced by several 
factors simultaneously. In fact Bruner (2004, p.63) emphasizes the heterogeneity of 
M&A, “all M&A is local”, meaning that the particular context of each deal explains an 
important part of its success/failure. Studying the context of M&A deals, some authors 
found evidence that the payment method, bidder and target’s characteristics, among 
other factors, influence acquiring shareholders’ gains. 
 
2.3.1 – Payment method 
The payment method can be used to minimize the risks of a takeover, for instance, 
related with loss of control and the valuation of the target firm (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2009). If there is asymmetric information between acquirers and external 
investors, acquiring managers use cash offers when they believe their shares are 
undervalued in the market, and equity in the opposite case (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2004).  
The ownership structure of the acquiring firm can impact on the shareholders 
valuation of the payment method. If the major acquiring shareholder has an intermediate 
level of control and the target firm has a high level of ownership concentration, cash 
payment may be chosen in order to keep the larger acquiring shareholder’s control 
position (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009).  
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Franks et al. (1991) state that acquiring companies’ equity may be negatively 
revaluated after an all-equity offer. In fact, there is evidence that acquiring companies 
have negative abnormal returns in equity offers (Travlos, 1987; Servaes, 1991; Andrade 
et al., 2001). In accordance with this evidence, Servaes (1991) and Martynova et al. 
(2011) present positive and significant returns for shareholders in all cash payments. On 
the other hand, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report higher abnormal returns for 
equity offers than cash offers. Leeth and Borg (2000) find no evidence that the payment 
method affects shareholders’ returns (appendix 3). 
Acquiring companies pay a higher premium in cross-border M&A comparing with 
domestic deals (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Cross-border deals are likely to be 
paid in cash due to target’s reluctance to accept foreign stock (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2009).  
 
2.3.2 – Bidder’s attitude 
An acquisition can be friendly or hostile, depending on the target firm’s reaction. It 
is a hostile bid if the target’s management and board of directors do not agree with the 
deal or the acquiring firm negotiates directly with the target’s shareholders (Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Martynova et al. (2011) find positive and 
significant abnormal returns for acquiring firms that have a friendly attitude towards the 
target. On the other hand, Frank and Harris (1989), Franks et al. (1991), and Servaes 
(1991) show that there is a negative effect of friendly bids on shareholders’ wealth, 
although only Franks et al. (1991) report significant evidence (appendix 4).  
The opposed bids by target companies have a negative abnormal performance 
(Franks et al., 1991; Servaes, 1991; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova et al., 
2011), a significant finding for European bidders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
Although it is expected some synergies in a hostile M&A, acquiring shareholders 
anticipate that the company has to pay a high premium as target’s management and 
shareholders may not agree with the deal (Martynova et al., 2011). 
Volpin and Rossi (2004) present a positive relation between hostile deals and 
target’s legal environment, in terms of common regulation and a similar shareholder 
protection. Consequently, it is expected lower hostile deals in target countries with 
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cross-border regulation. Volpin and Rossi (2004) state that cultural differences may 
trigger hostile attitudes in cross-border takeovers.   
 
2.3.3 – Industry relatedness  
In an M&A, the industry relatedness between the two firms may be a determinant 
of value creation to acquirers. Focused acquisitions occur when the acquirer buys a 
target that operates in the same sector or in a related industry. Diversified acquisitions 
involve targets from non-related businesses
9
.  
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report a positive effect of acquisitions for 
manufacturing and retailing industries, whereas for energy and service sectors there is a 
negative effect on acquirers’ returns. The financial sector has significant value creation 
in the short-term, but the abnormal returns are negative in the long-term.  
Analysing US and UK markets, there are positive abnormal returns for acquiring 
shareholders of focused acquisitions (Morck at al., 1990; Leeth and Borg, 2000; 
Martynova et al., 2011). However, only Martynova et al. (2011) present significant 
evidence of value creation (appendix 5). According to Andrade et al. (2001), M&A 
waves are characterized by different industry compositions, i.e., each industry is most 
likely to present high volumes of M&A in a specific wave than in the remaining waves.  
Considering diversified acquisitions in the US, there is a negative impact on 
shareholders’ wealth (Morck at al., 1990; Leeth and Borg, 2000). This finding is 
statistically significant in Morck at al. (1990). Nonetheless, Martynova et al. (2011) find 
positive abnormal returns for diversified deals in the European market.  
Regarding cross-border operations, Doukas and Travlos (1988) find a positive 
relation between announcement returns and diversifying acquisitions when the 
acquiring company is a multinational entering in a new market.  
In general, focused acquisitions create value while diversified acquisitions destroy 
acquiring shareholders value. A diversifying deal is beneficial to acquirers as it allows 
to increase the capital market with domestic or foreign targets. Nevertheless, agency 
costs, operating inefficiencies and other costs of diversification surpass the expected 
benefits (Martynova et al., 2011).  
                                                             
9 The industry relatedness is commonly analyzed using the digit SIC codes of the companies. 
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2.3.4 – Relative size 
The relative size between the acquirer and the target may influence the deal’s gains. 
Hence it is important to study the role of relative size in the M&A success. 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) state that when the target is relatively small, the 
acquiring shareholders’ gains are negatively affected. In fact, Asquith et al. (1983) and 
Servaes (1991) affirm that acquisition of larger targets create value. Considering the 
announcement month and a large window, Frank and Harris (1989) also document 
significant positive abnormal returns when the relative size of target to bidder is 
between 50% to 100% and the results are worst as the target relative size decreases. 
Though, Martynova et al. (2011) report negative abnormal returns for Continental 
European bidders.  
Roll (1986) presents some justifications for the fact that acquiring large companies 
gain higher abnormal returns. Firstly, bidders may carry on a more accurate valuation 
for large targets as a bad acquisition will affect considerably the acquirer. Therefore, the 
bidder can offer a lower premium. Additionally, the acquiring firm has more rivals 
when the target is small, which decreases its bargaining capacity. On the other hand, 
Martynova et al. (2011) emphasize that the acquisition of larger targets imply a more 
complex integration and hence investors may expect lower gains as synergies will be 
affected by integration costs.  
 
2.3.5 – Legal status 
The acquisition of private companies encompasses different procedures and 
challenges comparing with public companies. A private target is a firm with 100% of 
control and ownership concentration (Martynova et al., 2011). 
By studying the US market, Travlos (1987), Chang (1998) and Moeller et al. 
(2004), and the Western European acquisitions, Faccio et al. (2006), it is reported a 
listing effect in both markets: negative acquiring shareholders’ abnormal returns when a 
listed target is involved in the acquisition, and positive abnormal returns for unlisted 
targets (appendix 7). It is easier to negotiate with a concentrated corporate control and 
private firms’ shares may have a price discount due to their illiquid characteristic 
(Martynova et al., 2011). 
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Faccio et al. (2006) consider that different legal firms should be analysed separately 
as listed and unlisted targets present contrary results when studying the payment method 
effect on abnormal returns. In fact, considering listed targets, Travlos (1987), Moeller et 
al. (2004) and Faccio et al. (2006) report negative abnormal returns with stock payment. 
For privately held targets, there is evidence of higher abnormal returns for acquiring 
shareholders that offer stock (Chang, 1998; Moeller et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, the acquirer is more likely to offer cash for unlisted targets to control the 
risk of ownership change (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
Following the conclusions of Faccio et al. (2006), when the target is a public firm, 
cross-border deals have a positive effect and domestic deals have a negative effect on 
acquiring firm’s abnormal performance. On the other hand, Conn et al. (2005) state that 
cross-border deals are unfavourable for acquirers of public firms. Considering private 
targets, acquirers’ announcement returns are positive for both types of deals (Faccio et 
al., 2006; Conn et al., 2005).  
 
2.3.6 – Culture 
Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) state that it is necessary to study the integration 
process itself: for instance, the cultural impact on an M&A process. Defining culture in 
an M&A context is not simple
10
. Teerikangas and Very (2006) affirm that there is a 
relevant link between culture and M&A success. It is expected that the capital market 
considers the cultural differences when it values a merger, using all information 
available (Weber and Menipaz, 2003).  
Commonly, one expects culture to have a negative relation with M&A performance 
due to cultural barriers and consequent costs of integration. Indeed, Conn et al. (2005) 
report a negative effect of national cultural differences on the post-acquisition returns of 
cross-border deals. On the contrary, Morosini et al. (1998) emphasize a positive relation 
between cross-border acquisition performance and the national cultural distance. 
Nevertheless, literature is not consensual regarding the type of impact of organizational 
                                                             
10
 Culture is the constant influence of social and organizational forces over the individual, shaping his 
behaviour with routines, rules, etc, Edgar Schein (2004). National culture is a result of universal and 
cultural factors, as history and religion, affecting individuals’ values. Posteriorly, at the workplace, each 
person learns corporate practices, becoming a member of a specific organizational culture (Hofstede et 
al., 1990).  
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and national culture on M&A. In order to interpret the controversial findings, 
Teerikangas and Very (2006) refer the importance of analysing organizational and 
national culture separately; and the importance of considering the M&A process 
dynamics.  
Following Conn et al. (2005), we will use a composite index based on Hofstede’s 
(1991) classification of four national cultural dimensions. This index will allow 
measuring the numerical difference between each acquirer’s culture and the Portuguese 
target in cross-border deals. 
 
2.4 – Portuguese market  
The legal framework for M&A in Portugal is defined in the Commercial Code, and 
it is a civil law jurisdiction (Morgado and Galvão, 2013). The Portuguese M&A legal 
system has been based on the UK and US jurisdictions.  
Over the last two decades the FDI inward stock for Portugal has been increasing 
significantly: in 1990 it was 9,604 millions of dollars while in 2014 it represented 
108,515 millions of dollars. In 1997 the FDI inward stock was 18,076 millions of 
dollars UNCTAD (1999)
11
. The entry of Portugal into the Economic European 
Community in 1986 had a great importance in the following years in terms of FDI 
inflows (UNCTAD, 1998)
12
.  
Analysing the report of UNCTAD (2010)
13
 one can see that there was a significant 
decrease in FDI inflows between 2008 and 2009, as a consequence of the economic and 
financial crisis. In the following years FDI inflows have been recovering, except in 
2013 where there was a drop (UNCTAD, 2015)
14
. This pattern of FDI is in accordance 
with a slowdown M&A activity in terms of volume and value in the beginning of the 
crisis and the recovery period after (appendix 8). Portugal has been recovering from the 
economic and financial crisis with several public policies integrated in an Economic and 
Financial Adjustment Program. Nevertheless, there is still a high unemployment rate 
                                                             
11
 World Investment Report 1999, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
12
 World Investment Report 1998, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
13
 World Investment Report 2010, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
14
 World Investment Report 2015, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
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and a deflation threat, which leads to competitive costs and attracts international 
investors (EY, 2014).  
 
2.4.1 – Research findings for the Portuguese Market  
Considering operating performance studies, Barreira (2011) analyses five case 
studies of M&A that occurred in Portugal with the case study method. The findings are 
inconclusive, i.e, it is not possible to affirm which is the impact of M&A on operating 
performance during the pre and post-acquisition period (Barreira, 2011). Cunha (2012) 
studies the impact of M&A in shareholders’ wealth using performance indicators and 
the Economic Value Added (hereafter EVA). More specifically, the author analyses 
three case studies occurred between 2004 and 2008. On average, the EVA increases 
after the transactions, suggesting value creation for acquiring shareholders. It is also 
emphasized the fact that the indicator EVA is the most correlated with share price 
variations of analysed firms. Analysing the operating performance of M&A between 
SME companies in the Iberian Peninsula, Coelho (2013) finds value destruction for 
acquiring companies. The results were adjusted to the sector, dimension and pre-
acquisition performance.  
Now analysing event studies, Carvalho (2012) realized that takeovers present close 
to zero returns for acquiring shareholders in Portugal, over the period between 2000 and 
2010. Foreign acquirers earn more significant returns than domestic acquirers. Oliveira 
(2004) reached the same conclusions for M&A realized between 1997 and 2004 as he 
reported insignificant abnormal returns for acquirers of Portuguese targets. In this study 
it is also emphasized that acquiring firms obtain large returns when the Portuguese 
target is public than when it is a private company.  
If it is considered M&A activity inside the Portuguese banking sector, the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive. Cabo (2003) takes into account mergers realized in the 
Portuguese Agricultural Mutual Credit Integrated System since 1995 to 2001. In the 
post-acquisition period, the companies involved expect to take advantage of efficiency 
gains, in terms of costs reduction (due to a better management of factors of production) 
and an improved credit portfolio management. However, Cabo (2003) concludes that it 
is not achieved the expected positive impact of M&A for the sample analysed. Costa 
(2003) analyses the performance of a specific bank (Banco Comercial Português) that 
18 
 
has acquired a competitor bank (Banco Português do Atlântico). The indicators of 
acquirer’s operating performance improve comparing with the peer group, concluding 
that there is value creation for the shareholders in the long-term. 
 
2.4.2 – The importance of this study   
As we have already stated, there are few researches in the M&A literature 
considering the Portuguese market (Oliveira, 2004). Indeed, M&A in Portugal do not 
have a similar volume or value comparing with other countries frequently analysed in 
the literature. Although it concerns a lower volume of M&A when comparing with UK 
or US, our study is relevant in the sense that we will investigate and look for evidence 
that supports a solid analysis of the Portuguese market. Knowing the main 
characteristics of the market and common problems may be very useful for future 
investors. Understandably, analysing a small sample implies a careful reading of the 
findings. We only include majority stakes and we limit our scope to “pure” M&A 
transactions, excluding deal types as Joint Venture, Spin-off, Private Equity and 
Buyback. 
Oliveira (2004) and Carvalho (2012) consider temporal periods that are coincident 
with the period of our sample. The empirical evidence of the two event studies 
presented above is coherent. Accordingly, we expect to find low abnormal returns, on 
average, for acquiring firms of Portuguese targets.  
Our study sets itself apart from Oliveira (2004) and Carvalho (2012)’s analyses as 
comparing with the first author, we apply more restricted criteria including only 
completed and non-financial transactions which minimizes the influence of several 
external factors in the average abnormal performance. Regarding the second study, we 
consider mergers and a bigger scope in terms of time horizon.  
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3 – SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
Our objective is to measure value creation for acquiring Portuguese companies. 
Event study is a methodology that uses financial market data to measure the impact of 
economic events, as an M&A, in firms value (MacKinlay, 1997). This approach 
supports a relevant part of M&A literature. Moreover, it is more adapted to the sample 
of this study. Comparing with other markets, the Portuguese market is characterized by 
a low volume of M&A activity. Focus on operating performance would have made the 
situation even worse limiting the number of years analysed: it is necessary long periods 
of observation when using direct productivity/operating measures (MacKinlay, 1997). 
In our dissertation, value creation/destruction is calculated taking into consideration 
acquiring shareholders’ cumulative average abnormal returns. They are the residual 
owners of the firm and consequently it is an efficient way to study value creation 
(Martynova et al., 2008). More specifically, we study the average reaction of the stock 
market to M&A announcements. In fact, new information about a possible M&A 
changes expected cash flows due to future synergies between the companies (Campa 
and Hernando, 2004). In efficient markets (FFRJ, 1969), stock prices variations entirely 
integrate M&A’s wealth effect (Andrade et al., 2001). However, we have considered 
that the expected return does not consider all the announcement effects. The difference 
between the actual return (R) of the security and the normal return (E(R)), calculated for 
each day and company, represent abnormal return (AR): 
      ( )  
 
3.1 – Measure of abnormal returns  
The most common model used in the literature analysed is the MM (appendix 9). 
Some event studies use the economic model CAPM. MacKinlay (1997) states that the 
findings of these studies are very sensible to the restrictions applied in the CAPM. In 
our opinion the MM, considering market return as a factor model, has good explanatory 
characteristics to apply in our study. According to this model, 
 
 (    )                                  (1)                     
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assuming that: 
E(Ri,t) - expected return of the share of acquiring firm i on day t; 
Rm,t - return of a market index on day t; 
αi - measure of average return of shares of acquiring firm i that is not explained by 
the market; 
βi - measure of sensibility of shares of acquiring firm i to market volatility.  
εi,t - stochastic error, ∑       
 
In the MM there is a linear relation between the share return and the market return 
(MacKinlay, 1997). If the event has not occurred, i.e., if there was no M&A 
announcement, the difference between actual return and expected return on day t would 
be zero. However, these returns may be different. The abnormal return (AR) of the 
share of the acquiring firm i on day t is obtained as follows:  
 
                (          )      (2)               
                                                                                                                                      
Ri,t - actual return of the share of acquiring firm i on day t.  
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the acquiring firm i for a certain event 
window is the sum of abnormal performances since the day t=1 until the last day of the 
window: 
 
     ∑      
 
                                       (3) 
                                                                       
Finally, as we intend to present the abnormal performance of all acquiring firms, 
and using N as the number of companies, the cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) for acquiring firms are calculated as:  
 
     
∑     
 
   
 
                                      (4) 
                                                                       
The event windows that should be used are not consensual (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Our study does not include the post-acquisition period due to the 
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lack of statistical relevance of long-term abnormal returns as reported in Andrade et al. 
(2001), Campa and Hernando (2004), and Martynova et al. (2008). It is important to 
analyse possible abnormal returns before the announcement day as some information 
may be revealed through rumours or private information (Martynova et al., 2011). We 
used a 3 day event window (-1, +1), i.e., considering one day before and after the 
announcement day. Andrade et al. (2001) state this window is frequently used in event 
studies. Based on other studies (appendix 9), it is also used the announcement day and 
windows of 2, 7, and 11 days [(0, +1); (-1, 0); (-5, +1); (-5, +5)] following Doukas et al. 
(2001). We have considered several windows in order to diminish biases and better 
assess the impact of M&A. A too small event window may exclude information 
released before the announcement in media, while an extended window may mistakenly 
include previous positive movements in the acquiring firm’s stock price (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). 
Following the study of Martynova et al. (2011), our estimation window has 240 
days (day t = -270, …, -31). It is important to have an extended estimation window as it 
is assumed that the MM parameters are constant over the window. The MM parameters 
were estimated for each company using the Ordinary Least Squares (hereafter OLS) 
method. The OLS regression uses the estimators  ̂    and  ̂    during the estimation 
window. The estimators were obtained using a logarithm transformation to approximate 
the returns form to normality (Henderson, 1990): 
 
 ̂       (
  
    
)                                          (5) 
                                                                        
 ̂      (
  
    
)                                          (6) 
where, 
Pt – market price of the share of acquiring firm i on day t; 
Pt-1 – market price of the share of acquiring firm i on the day before day t; 
It – Index value on day t; 
It-1 – Index value on the day before day t; 
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We used the MSCI World Index as a proxy of the market return as our sample 
includes acquiring firms listed in different indexes worldwide. Nonetheless, The MSCI 
Europe Index was also used as market index in order to verify the robustness of the 
results. As the event window does not coincide with the estimation window, the 
estimated MM parameters are not affected by event returns. The abnormal returns 
entirely capture the announcement impact. We calculated the expected return as: 
 
 (    )    ̂   ̂                                (7) 
                                                                        
The expected returns were also estimated using the Market-adjusted model (MAM) 
and the Constant Mean Return model (CMRM). The MAM, a market model with 
restrictions (MacKinlay, 1997), does not consider the company risk: the expected return 
is equal to the market return (α=0 e β=1). As a result, this model does not require the 
designation of an estimation window to estimate parameters.  
 
 (    )                                                 (8) 
 
Brown and Warner (1985) conclude that simple models are comparable to more 
complex models in terms of capacity to identify abnormal performance. The CMRM 
considers that the expected return of each acquirer’s share is equal to the historical 
mean over the estimation period (β=0):  
 
 (    )  
∑    
     
      
   
                                   (9) 
                                    
3.2 – Test statistics 
The next step was to measure the significance of the abnormal returns obtained. 
The objective was to test if the M&A announcement produces impact on the stock price. 
Considering a parametric test, the rejection of the null hypothesis (H0: CAAR = 0) 
verifies that the event had impact for shareholders. Assuming that cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) have a normal distribution and are independently and 
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identically distributed over time, the test statistics for the null hypothesis has a t-Student 
distribution (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
 
CAAR ~ N(0,σ)                                      (10) 
                                                                          
       
    
 ̂ (   )
                                             (11) 
                                                                         
 ̂ (   )   √
 
   
∑ (         ) 
 
             (12) 
                                                                     
where: 
tstat – t-student test statistic with n-2 degrees of freedom for the MM and n-1 
degrees of freedom for the MAM and CMRM; 
CAAR – Cumulative average abnormal returns; 
CARi – Cumulative abnormal return of firm i, i = 1,…,N 
N – Total number of companies with available abnormal returns; 
S(CAR) – Standard deviation of CAR, an unbiased estimator of standard deviation 
of population (σ). 
 
To better interpret our findings we have also used two non-parametric tests besides 
the parametric test. In fact, it is reasonable to expect that the abnormal returns may not 
verify the parameters defined. The non-parametric tests are less demanding on the 
sample behaviour but they are not affected by outliers, and hence they produce robust 
results. The first non-parametric test used was the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
(Wilcoxon, 1945). This test considers the absolute value of abnormal returns (H0: 
median is equal to zero). The test statistics is assumed to approximately follow a normal 
distribution when the number of observations is large: 
 
   (   )                                                  (13) 
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                                               (14) 
                                                                          
24 
 
  ( )   
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                                 (15) 
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                                                     (16) 
                                                                         
where: 
z – Statistics for the Mann-Whitney rank test 
r = abnormal return for the observation i 
N = Number of observations i in a certain event window 
 
The use of daily data may imply abnormal returns with biased distribution, and 
hence the sign test is not appropriated (MacKinlay, 1997). The Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon rank-sum test allows us to test the significance of two independent samples 
when there is nonsymmetry. Mann and Whitney (1947) improved the rank test proposed 
by Wilcoxon (1945) considering two samples with different dimensions. The null 
hypothesis can be defined as “H0: There is no difference between the ranks of the two 
samples”. 
 
   (   )                                                  (17) 
                                                                         
 
  
  
    
 
√
    (       )
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where: 
z – Statistics for the Mann-Whitney rank test 
U – smaller sum of ranks between the two samples 
nA – dimension of sample A 
nB – dimension of sample B 
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3.3 – Sample description 
In this section we present the sample used in our study. For an M&A transaction to 
be included in the sample, we have defined some requirements: (1) the target firm is 
Portuguese; (2) the transaction was “completed” or “completed-assumed” between 
January 1997 and December 2014; (3) deal type is Acquisition or Merger - divestitures, 
joint-ventures, and management buyouts were not included, neither failed transactions 
as the anticipated gains in real asset were not realized; (4) the acquisition implies a 
change in ownership positions, i.e., the acquirer should control less than 50% of the 
target before the deal, and more than 50% after; (5) the companies involved are not 
financial institutions. After applying these five criteria in the Zephyr database, we have 
obtained a sample with 212 M&A transactions. 
Analysing the sample, it was eliminated transactions for the same acquirer that do 
not respect at least 120 trading days between the announcement days. Therefore, 60 
cases were removed.  
 The exclusion of acquirers that do not have available stock prices in some days of 
the event windows, or at least for 80 days of the estimation window affected 38 cases. 
Hence, the final sample for future considerations is constituted by 114 M&A bids. 
The identification of the correct announcement day is, unquestionably, very 
important when studying the abnormal returns caused by M&A publication. As a 
consequence, the information of Zephyr was verified in comparison with Bloomberg 
and News.  
The historical price (converted to USD) of all acquirers’ stock and MSCI Indexes 
were gathered using the Bloomberg database.  
Table 1 shows specific characteristics of our sample considering several important 
sub-samples based on the literature review. It is important to underline that there is a 
huge lack of information for the M&A bids studied, the conditions were not disclosed to 
some transactions.  
The number of cross-border bids surpass considerably the domestic bids which 
suggest that foreign companies are interested in making acquisitions in Portugal. Cross-
border transactions are very important to the M&A market dynamics in the Portuguese 
economy.  
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Table 1 - Description of sample characteristics 
 No. of bids 
Cross-border bid  
Yes  72 
No 42 
Payment Method  
All cash 31 
All stock 6 
Mixed 12 
Legal form  
Private target 18 
Public target 55 
Bidder’s attitude  
Friendly 114 
Hostile 0 
Initial stake equal to 0%  
Yes 84 
No 22 
Industry relatedness  
Focused acquisition 59 
Diversified acquisition 55 
Relative Size of target to acquirer  
Less than 50% 43 
Between 50% to 100% 7 
Cultural Difference  
High 34 
Low 37 
All M&A transactions considered 114 
Source: Own calculations considering information of Zephyr and Bloomberg databases. 
 
The preferred payment method is all cash. Public targets have a significant 
representation in the sample. Over the last decades M&A transactions in Portugal 
mainly included listed target companies. One can observe that hostile bids are not a 
common bidder’s attitude; this sub-sample will not be considered. It is also interesting 
to analyse differences between acquiring companies without any participation before 
the deal and the companies that already held a stake in the target.  
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Following Morck et al. (1990), the companies were defined as belonging to related 
industries when target and acquirer had the same four-digit SIC code among the top 
three industries they operate in. The deal was classified as diversified acquisition in all 
other cases. With this criterion it is possible to better distinguish differences between 
the firms’ field of expertise (Morck et al., 1990). There are not many diversification 
deals as the majority of acquirers prefer a target inside the same industry (Table 1 and 
2).  
 
Table 2 – Number of acquirers and targets by sector 
Major Sector No. of acquirers No. of targets 
Chemical, rubber, plastics 14 14 
Construction 8 1 
Food, beverages, tobacco 5 5 
Gas, Water, Electricity 9 12 
Hotels and restaurants 3 3 
Machinery, equipment, furniture 9 5 
Metals and metal products 4 7 
Other services 34 38 
Post and telecommunications 1 1 
Primary sector 0 1 
Publishing, printing 7 3 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 1 1 
Transport 1 4 
Wholesale and retail trade 10 10 
Wood, cork, paper 8 9 
Source: Zephyr database. 
 
In general targets are small in relation to the bidder, but due to the size of the sub-
sample we will not consider the target size.  As Conn et al. (2005), the cultural 
differences between foreign acquirers and the Portuguese targets where analysed 
through a composite index. This index is based on the Hofstede’s (1991) classification 
of four national cultural dimensions: power distance (appendix 10 – A), uncertainty 
avoidance (appendix 10 – B), individuality (appendix 10 – C), and masculinity 
(appendix 10 - D). The composite index considers the sum of the four cultural 
differences for each cross-border deal. After obtaining a median score of 130, it was 
attributed a high level of cultural difference to deals with a higher score than 130 and 
low level to the remaining deals.  
28 
 
As previously emphasized, the reduced dimension of the Portuguese economy 
demands foreign investment. Since 1997 it has occurred more cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions than domestic deals. After Portugal was qualified to enter in the Economic 
and Monetary Union in 1998, the number of bids increased expressively (Figure 1). The 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 were undoubtedly significant for the M&A activity in 
Portugal, largely supported by cross-border bids. Nonetheless, with the financial and 
economic crisis, the number of bids with Portuguese targets decreased and the 
difference between cross-border and domestic bids was attenuated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations considering information of Zephyr database. 
 
The main origin of foreign acquirers is Spain and France, due to the geographic 
proximity and strong economic relations (Figure 2), which is in accordance with the 
idea that bilateral trade is important in cross-border bids (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The 
USA also has a sturdy role in cross-border bids.  
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Figure 1 – Number of M&A bids by announcement year 
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Source: own calculations. Legend: AU – Australia; BG – Bulgaria; BR – Brazil; CA – Canada; CH – 
Switzerland; DE – Germany; ES – Spain; FI – Finland; FR – France; GB – United Kingdom; IT – Italy; 
JP – Japan; NL – Netherlands; SE – Sweden; US – United States of America.  
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Figure 2 – Number of cross-border bids by acquirer country 
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4 – RESULTS 
4.1 – Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
After applying the methodology to our sample, considering 6 event windows, 3 
models and 2 benchmark indexes, it is possible to present the abnormal returns for 
acquirers of Portuguese targets.  
The results of the MM are insignificant for the two market indexes and over all 
event windows as shown in Table 3. Therefore it is not possible to reject H0 and to 
affirm that M&A occurred since 1997 created or destroyed value to acquiring 
shareholders. Our findings using the MM are in agreement with Leeth and Borg (2000).  
In general the MAM also presents an insignificant abnormal performance. Our 
conclusion is similar to Jarrell and Poulsen (1989). The CMRM is not commonly used 
in the M&A literature. Nevertheless, it presents similar results to the MM and MAM. 
The evidence of insignificant returns in our study is also reported by authors that have 
used different models: Morck at al. (1990), Higson and Elliott (1998), and Campa and 
Hernando (2004).  
 
Table 3 – CAARs of all bids 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -0.08 +0.40 +0.02 +0.49 -0.48 -0.20 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 62.28 53.51 63.16 54.39 50.88 
Parametric test -0.03 +0.07 0.00 +0.11 -0.07 -0.02 
Signed-rank test +0.43 +0.91 +0.24 +0.69 +0.74 +0.81 
N = 114       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.06 0.00 +0.05 +0.11 -0.65 -0.61 
% Positive CAAR 53.70 56.48 53.70 62.96 51.85 47.22 
Parametric test  -0.02 0.00 +0.01 +0.02 -0.09 -0.07 
Signed-rank test +0.50 +0.27 +0.63 +0.46 +0.46 +1.10 
N = 108       
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 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MAM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.01 +0.46 +0.21 +0.66 -0.07 +0.37 
% Positive CAAR 54.39 59.65 55.26 58.77 51.75 54.39 
Parametric test  0.00 +0.08 +0.05 +0.14 -0.01 +0.05 
Signed-rank test +0.66 +0.87 +0.82 +0.97 +0.18 +0.07 
N = 114       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.03 +0.07 +0.27 +0.30 -0.38 -0.09 
% Positive CAAR 52.78 55.56 59.26 57.41 54.63 51.85 
Parametric test  +0.01 +0.02 +0.06 +0.06 -0.06 -0.01 
Signed-rank test +0.80 +0.22 +1.28 +0.75 +0.22 +0.15 
N = 108       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.13 +0.15 +0.05 +0.33 -0.37 -0.26 
% Positive CAAR 47.37 57.02 54.39 60.53 56.14 49.12 
Parametric test  -0.04 +0.03 +0.01 +0.07 -0.05 -0.03 
Signed-rank test +0.10 +0.45 +0.06 +0.39 +0.49 +0.89 
N = 114       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. 
 
Comparing outcomes of the three models (appendix 11) one can verify that they 
produce identical conclusions in terms of abnormal performance of acquirers. Although 
there is not a relevant difference, the results follow a different pattern if we use MSCI 
World Index to measure CAARs in comparison with MSCI Europe Index (appendix 
12). The benchmark MSCI World produces findings further away from zero. 
The Figure 3 is a representation of pre-acquisition returns evolution since 30 days 
before the announcement to 5 days after. The acquiring firms are underperforming the 
market before day 0 and this divergence is more pronounced during the “day -8” to the 
“day -3”. This decrease in CAARs may be a consequence of announcement rumours 
inside the market and hence investors anticipate a negative impact in the company value 
(taking into consideration that on average and generally speaking acquirers make bad 
acquisitions). However, after this period the cumulative returns start to recover and 
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become more similar to the market performance. Probably, near the announcement day 
and afterwards the market changes its interpretation as more information is disclosed 
(the price, the payment method, etc) and it is easier to judge if it is a good acquisition or 
not and the results suggest that the investors end up seeing the deal as neutral (neither 
value created nor value destroyed). In the Figure 3 one can see that investors’ 
expectations improve after “day -2”.  
Hereafter we will name similar patterns to Figure 3, before trading day 0, (i.e., 
noteworthy decline in accumulated abnormal returns some days before the official 
announcement eventually due to rumours; and a relevant increase in abnormal returns as 
information is released) as “Information effect”.  
 
Figure 3 – CAARs considering the performance, before and after the announcement 
(trading day 0) 
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
4.2 – Sub-sample results 
Trying to find a justification for the zero abnormal performance obtained in the 
previous section, we have measured the CAARs of some sub-samples with the support 
of the M&A literature. Only the results of Market-adjusted model with the MSCI World 
Index are presented in this section (the results of other models can be found in the 
appendix). 
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4.2.1 – Cross-border and domestic bids 
The abnormal returns of foreign and domestic acquirers are not significantly 
different from zero and the median of the two groups are equal as presented in Table 
4
15
. Our results for the major cross-border bids are in accordance with Doukas and 
Travlos (1988) that report insignificant findings using the MM. 
 
Table 4 – CAARs for cross-border and domestic bids 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
Cross-border bids       
CAAR (%) -0.10 +0.64 +0.12 +0.86 -0.32 -0.44 
% Positive CAAR 55.56 63.89 55.56 61.11 52.78 50.00 
Parametric test  -0.03 +0.10 +0.02 +0.16 -0.05 -0.06 
Signed-rank test +0.65 +1.24 +0.60 +1.11 +0.46 +0.15 
N = 72       
Domestic bids       
CAAR (%) +0.18 +0.15 +0.36 +0.33 +0.35 +1.75 
% Positive CAAR 52.38 52.38 54.76 54.76 50.00 61.90 
Parametric test  +0.08 +0.05 +0.15 +0.11 +0.07 +0.27 
Signed-rank test +0.16 +0.30 +0.46 +0.04 +0.37 +0.32 
Rank-sum test +0.28 +1.03 +0.02 +0.66 +0.48 +0.48 
N = 42       
Source: own calculations. The classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of 
Portuguese acquirers sample with foreign acquirers sample. 
 
Although insignificant, the positive effect on foreign acquirers’ returns obtained in 
the windows [0,+1]; [-1,0]; [-1,+1] is supported by Goergen and Renneboog (2004), 
Faccio et al. (2006), and Martynova et al. (2011). On the other hand, the CAARs in the 
announcement day, windows [-5,+1] and [-5,+5] are negative and insignificant in cross-
                                                             
15
 Insignificant results in the parametric test were also found in the MAM and CMRM (appendix 13). 
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border deals, and the negative sign is in agreement with Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005)
16
.  
Contrary to the results for cross-border deals the abnormal returns for domestic 
bidders are always positive in Table 4, however also insignificant
17
. The non-parametric 
tests have not changed the interpretation that the findings for domestic bids are not 
robust. The positive sign in abnormal performance of domestic bids is also found in 
Martynova et al. (2011). 
The Portuguese acquirers perform a slightly better than the market before the 
announcement deal, whereas foreign acquirers have a negative performance (Figure 4). 
The announcement day and the period surrounding affect bidders’ performances which 
suggest that an Information effect occurs. After the announcement, domestic acquiring 
companies continue to perform above the market and the foreign acquirers perform 
below.   
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
                                                             
16
 Similar findings are reported considering other models. Indeed, the median of foreign acquirers sample 
considered in the CMRM and window [-5, +5] is negative with a significance level of 10% (appendix 13 - 
A). 
17
 Other methodologies also present mostly positive and insignificant returns for domestic bids (appendix 
13 - B). 
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Figure 4 – CAARs considering the performance of cross-border and domestic bids, before 
and after the announcement (trading day 0) 
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4.2.2 – All cash, all stock and mixed payment   
In order to analyse the impact of the payment method we have considered all stock 
and mixed payment together as a sub-sample because there are few cases for each 
payment method (Table 1). 
Considering all cash sub-sample in Table 5, the CAARs are always positive and 
insignificant for the parametric tests. The M&A literature examined also reports a 
positive and insignificant effect (Travlos, 1987; Franks et al., 1991; and Leeth and Borg, 
2000). Our conclusion is also consistent with Servaes (1991), Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), Moeller et al. (2004), and Martynova et al. (2011), although their results are 
significant. 
  
Table 5 – CAARs for different payment methods 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
All cash       
CAAR (%) +0.47 +0.27 +0.73 +0.53 +0.50 +1.96 
% Positive CAAR 74.19 67.74 64.52 54.84 54.84 64.52 
Parametric test  +0.12 +0.05 +0.16 +0.10 +0.09 +0.27 
Signed-rank test +2.62* +1.66*** +2.72* +1.97** +1.50 +2.13** 
N = 31       
All stock and mixed       
CAAR (%) -1.56 +0.62 -0.65 +1.53 -1.60 -1.30 
% Positive CAAR 33.33 50.00 38.89 50.00 55.56 44.44 
Parametric test  -0.46 +0.06 -0.07 +0.22 -0.15 -0.10 
Signed-rank test +1.96** +0.62 +1.77*** +0.91 +0.60 +0.53 
Rank-sum test +2.89* +1.43 +2.99* +1.82*** +0.75 +1.48 
N = 18       
Source: own calculations. The benchmark MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The 
classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-
tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of all cash sample with other payments 
sample. 
 
36 
 
Nonetheless, the hypothesis of median equal to zero in all cash deals is rejected in 
all windows expect for window [-5, +1]
18
 (Table 5). We can affirm that the sample of 
all cash transactions have a positive median at a significance level of 1% in the 
announcement day and the window [-1, 0]. 
Contrarily to all cash offers, the negative and insignificant results for all stock and 
mixed payment deals in Table 5 are in accordance with Leeth and Borg (2000). Travlos 
(1987), Franks et al. (1991), Servaes (1991), and Andrade et al. (2001) also present 
negative, but relevant, findings for domestic deals.  
The median of all stock and mixed payment sample is different from zero in the 
announcement day and the window [-1,0]
19
 at a significance level of 5% and 10% 
respectively. The rank-sum test is significant over three windows, all cash deals have a 
different abnormal performance than other payments
20
.  
The non-parametric results described in this section are robust and the figures show 
that when we exclude the outliers of the sample, there is evidence that acquiring 
shareholders gain with all cash offers and lose with stock and mixed payments. As a 
consequence, the unusual deals of the sub-samples led to insignificant parametric tests.  
Analysing the cumulative abnormal returns of all cash deals in Figure 5, one can 
say that there is not a strong Information effect. However acquirers recover after “day -
3” until reaching the market performance in “day 5”. 
On the other hand, in Figure 5, stock and mixed payment present a similar 
performance in comparison to the market before the announcement period. Between 
“day -4” and “day 1” it is possible to observe the Information effect. The decrease in 
accumulated returns is very strong because there is an outlier acquirer that suffered a 
strong negative devaluation of its shares between “day -4” and “day -3”. After, there is 
also an accentuated increase due to the returns of an outlier company. The chart is very 
sensible to outliers because it is a small sub-sample. 
 
 
                                                             
18
 Similar conclusion was found in the other models (appendix 14 - A). 
19
 We emphasize the huge negative CAARs in the window [-5, +5] for the MM and the MSCI Europe, 
where the median is different from zero at a significance level of 10% (appendix 14 - B).  
20
 The rank-sum test has significant results in all event windows of the MAM for MSCI Europe (appendix 
14 - B).  
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Source: own calculations. 
 
4.2.3 – Private and public targets   
The abnormal performance of companies that acquire public and private targets is 
presented in Table 6.  
Disagreeing with the literature (Chang, 1998; Moeller et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 
2006, and Martynova et al., 2011), we have not found abnormal returns significantly 
different from zero for private and public target. Our study is not also in accordance 
with the conclusion of Oliveira (2004): acquirers have more abnormal returns with 
public Portuguese targets than when the target is private. Moreover, the non-parametric 
tests reinforce the idea that there is not a listing effect
21
.  
The Figure 6 shows that deals with private targets lead to negative accumulated 
returns for acquiring shareholders. There is a sharp decline of CAARs in “day -4” due 
to the huge negative performance of an outlier bidder. In fact, the private target sub-
sample is small. The Figure 6 presents a similar performance between the market and 
bidders of public Portuguese targets, the Information effect is very small for acquirers of 
public firms.  
  
                                                             
21
 This conclusion is coherent over the different methodologies (appendix 15). 
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Figure 5 – CAARs considering the performance of bids with different type of payment, 
before and after the announcement (trading day 0) 
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Table 6 – CAARs for target legal status 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
Private targets       
CAAR (%) +0.79 +0.54 +0.35 +0.10 +0.56 -0.36 
% Positive CAAR 72.22 61.11 72.22 55.56 61.11 44.44 
Parametric test  +0.36 +0.23 +0.10 +0.04 +0.20 -0.07 
Signed-rank test +1.61 +0.70 +0.90 +0.33 +0.59 +0.60 
N = 18       
Public targets       
CAAR (%) -0.14 +0.19 0.00 +0.33 +0.31 +1.13 
% Positive CAAR 50.91 25.45 20.00 25.45 23.64 21.82 
Parametric test  -0.04 +0.04 0.00 +0.07 +0.05 +0.16 
Signed-rank test +0.26 +0.48 +0.44 +0.86 +0.57 +0.58 
Rank-sum test +1.63 +0.40 +0.65 +0.09 +0.23 +0.87 
N = 55       
Source: own calculations. The benchmark MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The 
classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-
tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of private and public targets samples. 
 
Source: own calculations. 
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Figure 6 – CAARs considering the performance of bids with private and public targets, before 
and after the announcement (trading day 0) 
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4.2.4 – Acquirers with and without initial stake   
We divided the acquiring firms that already had an initial stake in the target and the 
firms that did not had with the aim of analysing if previous ownership influences 
acquirers’ gains. 
The sign of abnormal returns is positive for acquirers with 0% initial stake or more 
(Table 7) in the majority of the event windows. The performance is negative in the 
window [-5, +1] for both sub-samples but these are not significant results.  
The acquirers with no previous relation before the deal have a negative and 
insignificant abnormal return at the announcement day, while bidders with initial stake 
have positive and significant gains according to the non-parametric test at a significance 
level of 5% (Table 7)
22
. Also at the announcement day, the median of the sub-samples 
are different at a significance level of 10%
23
.  
  
Table 7 – CAARs for % of initial stake 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
0% initial stake       
CAAR (%) -0.14 +0.49 +0.16 +0.79 -0.08 +0.14 
% Positive CAAR 47.62 59.52 51.19 58.33 53.57 51.19 
Parametric test  -0.04 +0.08 +0.03 +0.16 -0.01 +0.02 
Signed-rank test +0.30 +0.54 +0.25 +0.83 +0.07 +0.45 
N = 84       
Initial stake > 0%       
CAAR (%) +0.57 +0.37 +0.33 +0.13 -0.10 +0.98 
% Positive CAAR 81.82 59.09 63.64 54.55 45.45 68.18 
Parametric test +0.31 +0.13 +0.15 +0.04 -0.02 +0.17 
Signed-rank test +2.11** +0.55 +1.44 +0.31 +0.69 +0.42 
Rank-sum test +1.75*** +0.14 +0.98 +0.19 +0.03 +0.60 
N = 22       
Source: own calculations. The benchmark MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The 
classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-
tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of acquirers with and without initial stake. 
                                                             
22
 A result also found in the MM, MSCI World, with a significance level of 10% (appendix 16 – B). 
23
 The same result is reported in the MM, MSCI World (appendix 16 – B). 
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We can conclude that, excluding outliers, acquiring firms with some ownership of 
the Portuguese target have a positive abnormal performance when announcing the deal. 
And the behaviour of their returns is different from the returns of acquirers without an 
initial stake. This reaction may be a consequence of less risk involved in the investors’ 
perspective when the acquirer already has a relation with the target announced, which 
implies more knowledge and an easier negotiation. 
Analysing Figure 7 one can see that acquirers with previous ownership have a 
better performance than the market, which is accordance with the conclusion that they 
may benefit from a more stable negotiation. In accordance, the Information effect is 
more expressive for acquirers with 0% initial stake.  
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
4.2.5 – Industry relatedness between acquirer and target 
The Table 8 presents the abnormal performance considering diversified and focused 
acquisitions. The consideration of sub-samples with the criteria of industry relatedness 
does not explain acquiring shareholders gains. In fact, the parametric and non-
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Figure 7 – CAARs considering the performance of acquirers with and without initial 
stake, before and after the announcement (trading day 0) 
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parametric tests are insignificant for all event windows
24
. Our conclusion is in 
accordance with Morck at al. (1990), Leeth and Borg (2000), and Doukas et al. (2001), 
author that used MM, MAM and a model with ratios respectively.  
Following Morck at al. (1990), we have considered four-SIC codes to analyse the 
sub-samples. Nonetheless, using two-SIC codes as Leeth and Borg (2000) and 
Martynova et al. (2011) the results do not change significantly.  
  
Table 8 – CAARs for industry relatedness 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
Focused       
CAAR (%) +0.10 +0.77 +0.09 +0.76 +0.49 +0.48 
% Positive CAAR 57.63 57.63 61.02 57.63 52.54 52.54 
Parametric test  +0.03 +0.12 +0.02 +0.15 +0.10 +0.08 
Signed-rank test +0.76 +0.42 +0.86 +0.56 +0.22 +0.41 
N = 59       
Diversified       
CAAR (%) -0.09 +0.13 +0.34 +0.56 -0.68 +0.25 
% Positive CAAR 50.91 61.82 49.09 60.00 50.91 56.36 
Parametric test -0.03 +0.03 +0.07 +0.13 -0.10 +0.03 
Signed-rank test +0.10 +0.81 +0.29 +0.80 +0.03 +0.52 
Rank-sum test +0.50 +0.22 +0.28 +0.23 +0.09 +0.64 
N = 55       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999.  The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. 
The Rank-sum test compares the median of acquirers that made diversified and focused acquisitions. 
 
The accumulated abnormal performance of acquirers in diversified acquisitions is 
better than the market performance, whereas the acquirers of focused acquisitions have 
a similar pattern comparing with market (Figure 8). The Information effect has a similar 
behaviour and intensity in both sub-samples, and therefore it is not possible to affirm 
that acquirers in different types of M&A deals have different gains when we consider 
the industry relatedness. 
                                                             
24
 This conclusion is coherent for other models (appendix 17). 
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Source: own calculations. 
 
4.2.6 – Cultural differences  
 With the aim of better understanding the results obtained for cross-border bids in 
section 4.2.1, we separated transactions where there was a high cultural difference 
between the foreign acquirer and the Portuguese target, and others transactions with low 
cultural difference. 
 Contrary to the idea of Teerikangas and Very (2006), culture is not a relevant 
context to the success of M&A bids realized with Portuguese targets. In fact, Table 9 
shows that sub-samples with high and low cultural difference have mixed and 
insignificant abnormal returns in the different event windows
25
. The cultural barriers do 
not impact the acquiring foreign shareholders’ returns. 
The signed-rank test in the window [0, +1] is positive and significant at a 10% level 
(Table 9), which is in accordance with the affirmation of Conn et al. (2005) that there is 
a negative relation between cross-border acquisition and the national cultural distance.  
Following Weber and Menipaz, (2003), it is expected that investors anticipate the 
impact of culture in M&A deals. For higher cultural differences, acquirers have to 
support more integration costs. In fact, the Figure 9 presents a similar performance 
                                                             
25 The same conclusion was found for other models (appendix 18). 
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Figure 8 – CAARs considering the industry relatedness, before and after the 
announcement (trading day 0) 
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between acquisitions with low cultural difference and the market, whereas bids with 
high cultural differences have a negative performance.  
Both sub-samples are affected by the Information effect, although it is less 
accentuated for low cultural differences. Moreover, the sub-samples present 
accumulated returns that become more and more negative as we approximate to the 
announcement day, which means that investors anticipated a negative impact as 
information were released. 
  
Table 9 – CAARs for cultural differences in cross-border bids 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
High difference       
CAAR (%) -0.28 +0.37 +0.04 +0.69 -1.59 -1.86 
% Positive CAAR 52.94 52.94 58.82 55.88 52.94 41.18 
Parametric test  -0.06 +0.04 0.00 +0.09 -0.19 -0.20 
Signed-rank test +0.58 +0.04 +0.46 +0.06 +0.34 +1.33 
N = 34       
Low difference       
CAAR (%) +0.07 +0.81 +0.21 +0.95 +0.74 +0.85 
% Positive CAAR 56.76 72.97 54.05 64.86 51.35 56.76 
Parametric test +0.05 +0.38 +0.09 +0.37 +0.24 +0.17 
Signed-rank test +0.26 +1.72*** +0.30 +1.51 +0.99 +0.48 
Rank-sum test +0.67 +0.90 +0.50 +0.68 +0.51 +0.81 
N = 37       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999.  The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. 
The Rank-sum test compares the median of acquirers that have low and high cultural differences with the 
Portuguese targets. 
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Source: own calculations. 
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Figure 9 – CAARs considering cultural differences, before and after the announcement 
(trading day 0) 
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5 – CONCLUSIONS 
Contributing to the M&A literature, this research is a study focused on the 
Portuguese market. The main objective is to analyse if M&A realized with Portuguese 
targets create value to acquiring firms. Furthermore, it is also questioned which factors 
most affect the success of these transactions. 
To explore value creation in the context explained above, we conduct an event 
study. It is an important methodology in the M&A literature, and particularly in short-
term analyses. For this purpose, we analyse the abnormal returns of acquiring 
shareholders, the residual owners of the firm. This method is applied to a sample of 114 
M&A deals involving Portuguese targets, since 1997 to 2014.  
We can conclude that there is not value creation or destruction of acquiring 
shareholders’ wealth when the target is Portuguese. This conclusion is robust in the 
three models and two market indexes. Indeed, a close to zero abnormal performance for 
acquirers is supported by different authors: Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), MAM; Leeth 
and Borg (2000), MM; Morck at al. (1990), ratio between bidder and target; Higson and 
Elliott (1998), Size decile benchmark; Campa and Hernando (2004), CAPM.  
The findings obtained for foreign acquirers diverge between the event windows. 
The negative effect, even though mainly insignificant, on foreign acquirers’ gains in the 
larger windows may represent an unfavourable aspect for foreign investors. In general, 
we cannot conclude that domestic and cross-border deals have relevant and different 
performances in Portugal. The cultural differences between acquirers and targets do not 
explain the success of cross-border bids.  
The factor payment method has not a significant impact on bidders’ gains in 
parametric tests, but the non-parametric tests indicate a positive effect of all cash deals 
on acquiring firms which is in agreement with the M&A literature. The target legal 
status and the industry relatedness are factors that do not influence acquirers’ abnormal 
performance. In terms of the target legal status this conclusion is contrary to what we 
expected in the literature review, while it is accordance with empirical evidence 
regarding the industry relatedness. The initial stake results tend to anticipate that 
acquirers with a previous relation with the target will gain with the M&A deal. 
Comparing with similar studies for the Portuguese market, the insignificant 
findings are in agreement with Oliveira (2004) and Carvalho (2012). Oliveira (2004) 
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analysed a broad range of M&A deals as he has considered all the operations registered 
in the Zephyr database with Portuguese targets between 1997 and 2004. As we have 
obtained a similar conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the “pure” M&A operations in 
Portugal do not create value. Noticeably, the conclusions of our study should be taken 
in consideration with great caution as it was considered a small sample in terms of 
volume and value.  
Future researches may restrict the criteria of Oliveira (2004) in order to figure out if 
there is value creation for companies acquiring Portuguese targets in other particular 
types of M&A not considered in this study, neither by Carvalho (2012). Furthermore, it 
would also be interesting to compare the results obtained with an analysis to M&A 
deals realized in the financial sector.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 – Resume of empirical evidence regarding value creation for acquiring 
companies over M&A waves 
 
WAVES: 2
nd
 wave (1910s-1929) and 3
rd
 wave (1950s-1973); 4
th
 wave (1981-1989); 5
th
 wave (1993-
2001). 
TYPE OF DEAL: A – Acquisitions; M – Mergers; M&A – Mergers and Acquisitions; M&A - Priv – 
M&A of Private targets; M&A - Pub – M&A of Public targets; TO – Tender Offers. 
TYPE OF STUDY: LT FP – Long-term Financial Performance; OP – Operating Performance; ST FP – 
Short-term Financial Performance. 
CONCLUSION: AP – Announcement Period; Pre-AP – Pre-Announcement Period; Post-AP – Post-
Announcement Period. 
 
 
Authors Period 
Type of 
Deal 
Nº 
Deals 
Type 
of 
Study 
Conclusion 
W
a
v
es
 
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 
Jensen et al. (1983), 
US 
1956-1981 TO 
M 
- ST FP Positive abnormal performance  
Zero abnormal performance 
Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989), US 
1963-1986 TO 450 ST FP Close to zero abnormal performance 
Andrade et al. 
(2001), US 
1973-1998 M 3,688 ST FP Negative abnormal performance 
2
n
d
 a
n
d
 3
rd
 w
a
v
e 
Leeth and Borg 
(2000), US 
1919-1930 M&A 466 ST FP Close to zero abnormal performance 
Lev & Mandelker 
(1972), US  
1952-1963 M&A 69 OP Profitability: positive performance 
Other measures: Insignificant 
changes in performance 
Hogarty (1970), US 1953-1964 M&A 43 OP Negative performance (Post-AP) 
Frank and Harris 
(1989), UK 
1955-1985 TO 
M 
 
1,012 
46 
 
ST FP  
 
LT FP 
Positive abnormal performance 
Negative abnormal performance 
Inconclusive  
4
th
 w
a
v
e 
Agrawal et al. 
(1992), US 
1955-1987 TO 
M 
227 
937 
LT FP Close to zero abnormal performance  
Negative abnormal performance  
Servaes (1991), US 1972-1987 All deals 384 ST FP Negative abnormal performance 
Franks et al. (1991), 
US 
1975-1984 M&A 399 ST FP  
 
LT FP 
Small negative abnormal 
performance 
Close to zero abnormal performance 
Morck at al. (1990), 
US 
1975-1987 M&A 326 ST FP Close to zero abnormal performance 
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4
th
 w
a
v
e 
Higson and Elliott 
(1998), UK 
1975-1990 All deals 830 ST FP  
LT FP 
Insignificant abnormal performance 
Insignificant abnormal performance 
Healy et al. (1992), 
US 
1979-1984 Largest 
deals 
50 OP 
  
Operating cash flow performance 
improves 
Sharma & Ho 
(2002), Australia 
1986-1991 All deals 36 OP Insignificant changes in 
performance (Post-AP) 
5
th
 w
a
v
e 
Moeller et al. 
(2004), US 
1980-2001 M&A 12,023  ST FP  
 
LT FP 
Positive abnormal performance 
 
Close to zero abnormal performance 
Gugler et al. 
(2003), World 
1981-1998 All deals 2,753 OP 
  
Profits are higher and sales are 
lower than projected (Post-AP) 
Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004), 
Europe 
1993-2000 M&A 142 
  
ST FP Positive (AP); 
Negative (Post-AP) 
abnormal performance 
Martynova et al. 
(2011), Europe 
1993-2001 M&A 2,419 
  
ST FP Positive (AP); 
Negative (Post-AP) 
abnormal performance 
Faccio et al. (2006), 
Europe 
1996-2001 M&A - 
Priv 
M&A - 
Pub 
3,694 
 
735 
ST FP  Positive abnormal performance 
 
Insignificant abnormal performance 
Martynova et al. 
(2007), Europe 
1997-2001  M&A 115 OP Insignificant changes in 
performance (Post-AP) 
Campa and 
Hernando 
(2004), EU 
1998-2000 M&A 262 ST FP Insignificant abnormal performance 
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Appendix 2 - Resume of empirical evidence regarding value creation for acquiring 
companies in cross-border and domestic M&A 
 
TYPE OF DEAL: CBB – Cross-border bid; DB – Domestic bid; M&A – Mergers and Acquisitions; 
M&A - Priv – M&A of Private targets; M&A - Pub – M&A of Public targets. 
TYPE OF STUDY: LT FP – Long-term Financial Performance; OP – Operating Performance; ST FP – 
Short-term Financial Performance. 
CONCLUSION: AP – Announcement Period; Post-AP – Post-Announcement Period. 
 
Authors Period 
Type of 
Deal 
Nº Deals 
CBB/DB 
Type of 
Study 
Conclusion 
CBB/DB 
Doukas and 
Travlos (1988), 
US 
1975-1983 M&A 301 ST FP Insignificant abnormal 
performance 
Gugler et al. 
(2003), World 
1981-1998 All deals 429/2,288 OP Profits: positive/positive 
Sales: negative/negative 
Moeller and 
Schlingemann 
(2005), US 
1985-1995 M&A 383/4,046 ST FP  
OP 
Negative cross-border 
effect 
Francis et al. 
(2008), US 
1990-1995 
 
1996-2003 
M&A  
 
353/2,244 
 
1,138/5,368 
ST FP Negative cross-border 
effect  
Positive cross-border 
effect 
Goergen and 
Renneboog 
(2004), Europe 
1993-2000 M&A All countries: 56/86 
Southern Europe: 4/8 
ST FP Positive/Negative 
Martynova et al. 
(2011), Europe 
1993-2001 M&A  653/1,456 ST FP CBB and DB:  
Positive (AP), 
Negative (Post-AP) 
Faccio et al. 
(2006), Europe 
1996-2001 M&A - Priv 
M&A - Pub 
1,848/1,846 
366/369 
ST FP Positive/Positive 
Positive/Negative 
Martynova, et 
al. (2006), 
Europe 
1997-2001  M&A 37/73 OP Negative/Positive 
Campa and 
Hernando 
(2004), EU 
1998-2000 M&A 80/182 ST FP Larger return for DB 
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Appendix 3 – Summary of event studies: empirical evidence of abnormal returns 
for acquiring companies considering type of payment 
Authors Period 
Type of 
Payment 
Nº Deals 
Event Window 
(days) 
CAARs 
(%) 
Leeth and Borg (2000), 
US 
1919-1930 Cash 
Stock 
41 
156 
Between 1 month 
before announcement 
and the month of 
completion 
+2.47 
-1.12 
Travlos (1987), US 1972-1981 Cash 
Stock 
100 
60 
Announcement day +0.26 
-1.03* 
Servaes (1991), US 1972-1987 Cash 
Stock 
Mixed  
172 
142 
66 
[0, close] +3.44* 
-5.86* 
-3.74* 
Andrade et al. (2001), US 1973-1979 Stock 
No stock 
2,194 
1,494 
[-1, +1] 
 
-1.5** 
+0.4 
Franks et al. (1991), US 1975-1984 Cash 
Stock 
Mixed  
156 
128 
114 
[-5, +5] 
 
+0.83 
-3.15* 
-1.18 
Moeller et al. (2004), US 1980-2001 Cash 
Stock 
Mixed bid 
Cash - Public 
Stock - Public 
Mixed -Public  
Cash - Private  
Stock – Private 
Mixed - Private 
4,862 
2,958 
4,203 
2,060 
1,553 
1,970 
396 
1,199 
1,047 
[-1, +1] 
 
+1.38* 
+0.15* 
+1.45* 
+1.21* 
+1.49* 
+1.80* 
+0.36 
-2.02* 
-0.40* 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), Europe 
1993-2000 Cash 
Stock 
Mixed  
86 
33 
23 
[-2, +2] 
 
+0.90*** 
+2.57* 
+0.22 
Martynova et al. (2011), 
Europe 
1993–2001 Cash 
Stock 
Mixed  
754 
285 
412 
[-1, +1] 
 
+0.80* 
+0.12 
+1.17* 
Faccio et al. (2006), 
Europe 
1996-2001 Cash - Public 
Stock - Public 
Mixed -Public  
Cash - Private  
Stock – Private 
Mixed - Private 
436 
189 
110 
2,876 
201 
617 
[-2, +2] 
 
+0.30 
-1.81** 
-0.66 
+1.17* 
+3.90* 
+2.14* 
Significance level: */**/*** - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 4 – Summary of event studies: empirical evidence of abnormal returns 
for acquiring companies considering different attitudes towards the bid 
Authors Period Attitude Nº Deals 
Event Window 
(days) 
CAARs 
(%) 
Frank and Harris (1989), 
UK 
1955-1985 Single Bids 
Multiple Bids: 
Hostile 
Friendly 
1,445 
1,238 
123 
84 
Announcement month +0.0 
+0.0 
+0.3 
-0.4 
Servaes (1991), US 1972-1987 Friendly  
Hostile 
307 
77 
[0, close] -0.16 
-4.71 
Franks et al. (1991), US 1975-1984 Friendly  
Hostile 
306 
93 
[-5, +5] -0.92*** 
-1.35 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), Europe 
1993-2000 Friendly  
Hostile 
55 
32 
[-2, +2] 
 
+1.94* 
-3.43* 
Martynova et al. (2011), 
Europe 
1993–2001 Friendly  
Opposed  
1,659 
120 
[-1, +1] 
 
+1.06* 
-0.83 
Significance level: */**/*** - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
Appendix 5 – Summary of event studies: empirical evidence of abnormal returns 
for acquiring companies considering industry relatedness 
Authors Period Industry Nº Deals 
Event Window 
(days) 
CAARs 
(%) 
Leeth and Borg (2000), 
US 
1919-1930 Focused bid 
Diversified bid 
417 
28 
One month before 
takeover to the month 
of completion 
+0.61 
-2.30 
Morck at al. (1990), US 1975-1979 
1980-1987 
1975-1979 
1980-1987 
Focused bid 
 
Diversified bid 
34 
57 
120 
115 
[-2, +1] 
 
+1.54 
+2.88 
+0.23 
-4.09** 
Doukas et al. (2001), 
Sweden 
1980-1995 Focused bid 
Diversified bid 
45 
47 
[-5, +5] +2.34** 
-1.77 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), Europe 
1993-2000 Energy 
Manufacture 
Services 
Retailer 
Bank 
9 
63 
28 
20 
22 
[-2, +2] 
 
-0.83 
+2.92* 
-2.19** 
+2.19** 
-0.15 
Martynova et al. (2011), 
Europe 
1993–2001 Focused bid 
Diversified bid 
1,334 
774 
[-1, +1] 
 
+0.85* 
+0.49** 
Campa and Hernando 
(2004), EU 
1998-2000 Non-regulated 
Regulated  
202 
60 
[-30, -1] +1.68** 
-1.81** 
Significance level: */**/*** - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 6 – Summary of event studies: empirical evidence of abnormal returns 
for acquiring companies considering relative size  
Authors Period Relative Size Nº Deals 
Event Window 
(days) 
CAARs 
(%) 
Frank and 
Harris (1989), 
UK 
1955-1985 Relative size of target to 
bidder (Market value): 
All Mergers 
 
Less than 50% 
 
Between 50% to 100% 
 
Greater than 100% 
 
 
 
844 
 
439 
 
124 
 
62 
 
 
 
0 month 
[-4,+1] months 
0 month 
[-4,+1] months 
0 month 
[-4,+1] months 
0 month 
[-4,+1] months 
 
 
+0.1 
+3.5** 
-0.1 
+2.3 
+2.1 
+5.8** 
-1.2 
+6.0 
Asquith et al. 
(1983), US 
 
 
1963- Set.1979 
 
1963- Out.1979 
 
Successful Mergers - Relative 
size of target to bidder: 
Greater than 10% 
Less than 10% 
Greater than 10% 
Less than 10% 
 
 
33 
38 
38 
61 
 
[-20,0] 
 
 
 
+7.1* 
+2.9 
+3.7*** 
+1.6 
Martynova et 
al. (2011), 
Europe 
1993–2001 UK Bidders  
 
European bidders (except UK) 
 
624 
 
958 
[-1,+1] 
[-60,-2] 
[-1,+1] 
[-60,-2] 
-0.00 
-0.04** 
-0.09 
+0.07 
Significance level: */**/*** - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 7 – Summary of event studies: empirical evidence of abnormal returns 
for acquiring companies considering target legal status  
 
TYPE OF DEAL: CBB – Cross-border bid; DB – Domestic bid. 
 
Authors Period Legal status Nº Deals 
Event Window 
(days) 
CAARs 
(%) 
Moeller et al. (2004), US 1980-2001 Private 
Public 
5,583 
2,642 
[-1, +1] 
 
+1.50* 
-1.02* 
Chang (1998), US 1981-1992 Private  
Cash offers 
Stock offers 
Public 
Cash offers 
Stock offers 
 
131 
150 
 
101 
154 
[-1, 0]  
+0.09 
+2.64* 
 
-0.02 
-2.46* 
Conn et al. (2005), UK 1984-1998 Private 
DB 
CBB 
Public  
DB 
CBB 
 
2,628 
1,009 
 
576 
131 
[-1, +1] 
 
 
+1.05* 
+0.38** 
 
-0.99* 
-0.09 
Martynova et al. (2011), 
Europe 
1993–2001 Private 
Listed 
1,532 
576 
[-1, +1] 
 
+1.08* 
-0.25 
Faccio et al. (2006), Europe 1996-2001 Private  
Cash  
Stock  
Mixed 
DB 
CBB 
Public  
DB  
CBB  
Mixed 
Domestic 
Cross 
 
2,876 
201 
617 
1,846 
1,848 
 
436 
189 
110 
369 
366 
[-2, +2] 
 
 
+1.17* 
+3.90* 
+2.14
*
 
+1.62* 
+1.33* 
 
+0.30 
-1.81** 
-0.66 
-0.87 
+0.11 
Significance level: */**/*** - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 8 – Announced M&A in Portugal by year  
 
 
 
 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances. YTD: August 18; e: expected full year based on 
Jan 01 – Aug 18.  
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Appendix 9 – Summary of methodological aspects in event studies  
 
BENCHMARK MODEL: MM – Market model, MAM – Market-adjusted model, CAPM – Capital 
Asset Pricing model, BMCP – Beta-matched control portfolio. 
 
Authors Period Benchmark model Event Window (days) 
Leeth and Borg (2000), US 1919-1930 MM; MAM One month before takeover to the 
month of completion 
Frank and Harris (1989), 
UK 
1955-1985 MM; MAM; CAPM Announcement month  
Period of 6 months 
Asquith et al. (1983), US 1963-1979 BMCP [-20, 0] 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
US 
1963-1986 MAM [-2, +1]; [-5, +5] 
Travlos (1987), US 1972-1981 MM Ten days before and after the 
announcement day 
Servaes (1991), US 1972-1987 MM [0, close] 
Andrade et al. (2001), US 1973-1979 MM [-1, +1]; [-20, close] 
Doukas and Travlos (1988), 
US 
1975-1983 MM Ten days before and after the 
announcement day 
Franks et al. (1991), US 1975-1984 MM [-5, +5] 
Morck at al. (1990), US 1975-1987 Ratio: bidder equity 
value and the price of 
target’s equity 
[-2, +1] 
Higson and Elliott (1998), 
UK 
1975-1990 Size decile benchmark Announcement month 
Doukas et al. (2001), 
Sweden 
1980-1995 MM [-5, +5]; [-5, +1]; [-1, +1]; [-1, 0]; [0, 
+1] 
Moeller et al. (2004), US 1980-2001 MM [-1, +1] 
Chang (1998), US 1981-1992 MM [-1, 0] 
Conn et al. (2005), UK 1984-1998 MAM [-1, +1] 
Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005), US 
1985-1995 MAM [-1, +1] 
 
Francis et al. (2008), US 1990-2003 MM [-1, +1] 
 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), Europe 
1993-2000 Six measures of beta.  
CAPM 
[-1, 0]; [-2, +2]; [-40, 0]; [-60, +60] 
Martynova et al. (2011), 
Europe 
1993–2001 MM [-1, +1]; [-60, +60] 
Faccio et al. (2006), Europe 1996-2001 MAM [-2, +2] 
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Appendix 10 – Hofstede’s (1991) classification of national cultural dimensions  
A – Power distance index (PDI) 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
PDI 
Score 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
PDI 
Score 
1 Malaysia 104 27/28 South Korea 60 
2/3 Guatemala 95 29/30 Iran 58 
2/3 Panama 95 29/30 Taiwan 58 
4 Philippines 94 31 Spain 57 
5/6 Mexico 81 32 Pakistan 55 
5/6 Venezuela 81 33 Japan 54 
7 Arab countries 80 34 Italy 50 
8/9 Equator 78 35/36 Argentina 49 
8/9 Indonesia 78 35/36 South Africa 49 
10/11 India 77 37 Jamaica 45 
10/11 West Africa 77 38 USA 40 
12 Yugoslavia 76 39 Canada 39 
13 Singapore 74 40 Netherlands 38 
14 Brazil 69 41 Australia 36 
15/16 France 68 42/44 Costa Rica 35 
15/16 Hong Kong 68 42/44 Germany FR 35 
17 Colombia 67 42/44 Great Britain 35 
18/19 Salvador 66 45 Switzerland 34 
18/19 Turkey 66 46 Finland 33 
20 Belgium 65 47/48 Norway 31 
21/23 East Africa 64 47/48 Sweden 31 
21/23 Peru 64 49 Ireland (Republic of) 28 
21/23 Thailand 64 64 50 New-Zealand 22 
24/25 Chile 63 51 Denmark 18 
24/25 Portugal 63 52 Israel  13 
26 Uruguay  61 53 Austria 11 
27/28 Greece  60  
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B – Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
UAI 
Score 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
UAI 
Score 
1 Greece 112 28 Equator 67 
2 Portugal 104 29 Germany FR 65 
3 Guatemala 101 30 Thailand 64 
4 Uruguay 100 31/32 Iran 59 
5/6 Belgium  94 31/32 Finland 59 
5/6 Salvador 94 33 Switzerland 58 
7 Japan 92 34 West Africa 54 
8 Yugoslavia 88 35 Netherlands 53 
9 Peru 87 36 East Africa 52 
10/15 France 86 37 Australia 51 
10/15 Chile 86 38 Norway 50 
10/15 Spain 86 39/40 South Africa 49 
10/15 Costa Rica 86 39/40 New Zealand 49 
10/15 Panama 86 41/42 Indonesia 48 
10/15 Argentina 86 41/42 Canada 48 
16/17 Turkey 85 43 USA 46 
16/17 South Korea 85 44 Philippines 44 
18 Mexico 82 45 India 40 
19 Israel 81 46 Malaysia 36 
20 Colombia 80 47/48 Great Britain 35 
21/22 Venezuela 76 47/48 Ireland (Republic of) 35 
21/22 Brazil 76 49/50 Hong Kong 29 
23 Italy 75 49/50 Sweden 29 
24/25 Pakistan 70 51 Denmark 23 
24/25 Austria 70 52 Jamaica 13 
26 Taiwan 69 53 Singapore 8 
27 Arab countries 60    
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C – Individualism index (IDV) 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
IDV 
Score 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
IDV 
Score 
1 USA 91 28 Turkey 37 
2 Australia 90 29 Uruguay 36 
3 Great Britain 89 30 Greece 35 
4/5 Canada 80 31 Philippines 32 
4/5 Netherlands  80 32 Mexico 30 
6 New Zealand 79 33/35 East Africa  27 
7 Italy 76 33/35 Yugoslavia 27 
8 Belgium 75 35/36 Portugal 27 
9 Denmark 74 36 Malaysia 26 
10/11 Sweden 71 37 Hong Kong 25 
10/11 France 71 38 Chile 23 
12 Ireland (Republic of) 70 39/41 West Africa 20 
13 Norway 69 39/41 Singapore 20 
14 Switzerland 68 39/41 Thailand 20 
15 Germany FR 67 42 Salvador 19 
16 South Africa 65 43 South Korea 18 
17 Finland 63 44 Taiwan 17 
18 Austria 55 45 Peru 16 
19 Israel  54 46 Costa Rica 15 
20 Spain 51 47/48 Pakistan 14 
21 India 48 47/48 Indonesia 14 
22/23 Japan 46 49 Colombia 13 
22/23 Argentina 46 50 Venezuela 12 
24 Iran 41 51 Panama 11 
25 Jamaica 39 52 Equator  8 
26/27 Brazil 38 53 Guatemala 6 
26/27 Arab countries 38    
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D – Masculinity index (MAS) 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
MAS 
Score 
Score 
rank 
Country or region 
MAS 
Score 
1 Japan 95 28 Singapore 48 
2 Austria 79 29 Israel 47 
3 Venezuela 73 30/31 Indonesia 46 
4/5 Italy 70 30/31 West Africa 46 
4/5 Switzerland 70 32/33 Turkey 45 
6 Mexico 69 32/33 Taiwan 45 
7/8 Ireland (Republic of 68 34 Panama 44 
7/8 Jamaica 68 35/36 Iran 43 
9/10 Great Britain 66 35/36 France 43 
9/10 Germany FR 66 37/38 Spain 42 
11/12 Philippines 64 37/38 Peru 42 
11/12 Colombia 64 39 East Africa 41 
13/14 South Africa  63 40 Salvador 40 
13/14 Equator 63 41 South Korea 39 
15 USA 62 42 Uruguay 38 
16 Australia 61 43 Guatemala 37 
17 New Zealand 58 44 Thailand 34 
18/19 Greece 57 45 Portugal 31 
18/19 Hong Kong 57 46 Chile 28 
20/21 Argentina 56 47 Finland 26 
20/21 India 56 48/49 Yugoslavia 21 
22 Belgium 54 48/49 Costa Rica 21 
23 Arab countries 53 50 Denmark 16 
24 Canada 52 51 Netherlands 14 
25/26 Malaysia 50 52 Norway 8 
25/26 Pakistan 50 53 Sweden 5 
27 Brazil 49    
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Appendix 11 – CAARs of three different models for all acquirers, considering the 
benchmark MSCI World Index  
Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Appendix 12 – CAARs obtained with two different benchmark indexes  
Source: own calculations.  
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Appendix 13 – CAARs for cross-border and domestic bids 
A – Cross-border bids 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -0.23 +0.56 -0.13 +0.65 -0.92 -1.22 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 65.28 52.78 68.06 52.78 47.22 
Parametric test  -0.07 +0.08 -0.02 +0.12 -0.13 -0.15 
Signed-rank test +0.21 +1.14 +0.04 +0.83 +0.64 +1.29 
N = 72       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 +0.07 -1.18 -1.77 
% Positive CAAR 54.55 59.09 54.55 65.15 48.48 42.42 
Parametric test  -0.04 -0.01 0.00 +0.01 -0.14 -0.18 
Signed-rank test +0.66 +0.69 +0.69 +0.75 +0.33 +1.48 
N = 66       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.05 +0.10 +0.27 +0.32 -0.75 -1.01 
% Positive CAAR 57.58 59.09 62.12 57.58 56.06 50.00 
Parametric test  +0.01 +0.02 +0.05 +0.06 -0.10 -0.12 
Signed-rank test +1.21 +0.84 +1.38 +1.07 +0.46 +0.42 
N = 66       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.19 +0.32 -0.05 +0.46 -0.81 -1.53 
% Positive CAAR 47.22 58.33 55.56 62.50 54.17 47.22 
Parametric test  -0.06 +0.05 -0.01 +0.08 -0.12 -0.18 
Signed-rank test +0.13 +0.34 +0.13 +0.34 +0.53 +1.67*** 
N = 72       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test.  
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B – Domestic bids 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.18 +0.12 +0.27 +0.21 +0.27 +1.56 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 57.14 54.76 54.76 57.14 57.14 
Parametric test +0.08 +0.04 +0.12 +0.07 +0.05 +0.21 
Signed-rank test +0.43 +0.02 +0.25 +0.06 +0.38 +0.44 
Rank-sum test +0.16 +0.71 +0.21 +0.52 +0.15 +1.25 
N = 42       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.05 +0.05 +0.18 +0.18 +0.18 +1.21 
% Positive CAAR 52.38 52.38 52.38 59.52 57.14 54.76 
Parametric test +0.02 +0.02 +0.07 +0.06 +0.03 +0.17 
Signed-rank test +0.28 0.00 +0.12 +0.25 +0.05 +0.89 
Rank-sum test +0.53 +0.77 +0.45 +0.70 +0.03 +1.11 
N = 42       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.01 +0.01 +0.27 +0.26 +0.20 +1.36 
% Positive CAAR 45.24 50.00 54.76 57.14 52.38 54.76 
Parametric test  0.00 0.00 +0.11 +0.09 +0.04 +0.22 
Signed-rank test +0.31 +0.77 +0.23 +0.26 +0.27 +0.27 
Rank-sum test +0.98 +1.08 +0.66 +0.81 +0.45 +0.54 
N = 42       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.02 -0.14 +0.22 +0.11 +0.39 +1.92 
% Positive CAAR 47.62 54.76 52.38 57.14 59.52 52.38 
Parametric test  -0.01 -0.04 +0.09 +0.03 +0.06 +0.23 
Signed-rank test +0.28 0.00 +0.12 +0.25 +0.05 +0.89 
Rank-sum test +0.27 +0.48 +0.24 +0.05 +0.31 +1.82*** 
N = 42       
Source: own calculations. The classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of 
Portuguese acquirers sample with foreign acquirers samples. 
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Appendix 14 – CAARs for different payment methods 
A – All cash payment 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.31 +0.10 +0.40 +0.19 -0.01 +1.17 
% Positive CAAR 67.74 64.52 54.84 58.06 58.06 54.84 
Parametric test  +0.08 +0.02 +0.09 +0.04 0.00 +0.16 
Signed-rank test +1.99** +1.42 +1.74*** +1.36 +0.49 +0.98 
N = 31       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.28 +0.07 +0.43 +0.22 -0.04 +0.99 
% Positive CAAR 67.74 58.06 58.06 64.52 51.61 54.84 
Parametric test  +0.07 +0.01 +0.10 +0.04 -0.01 +0.13 
Signed-rank test +1.81*** +1.21 +1.99** +1.48 +0.63 +0.90 
N = 31       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.32 +0.15 +0.58 +0.41 +0.30 +1.76 
% Positive CAAR 70.97 61.29 67.74 61.29 61.29 58.06 
Parametric test  +0.08 +0.03 +0.13 +0.08 +0.05 +0.25 
Signed-rank test +2.34** +1.51 +2.56** +1.92*** +1.40 +1.97** 
N = 31       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) +0.35 +0.04 +0.60 +0.29 +0.44 +1.15 
% Positive CAAR 64.52 61.29 67.74 61.29 64.52 58.06 
Parametric test  +0.09 +0.01 +0.14 +0.05 +0.07 +0.14 
Signed-rank test +1.83*** +1.23 +1.94 +1.48 +0.46 +0.94 
N = 31       
Source: own calculations. The classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test.  
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B – All Stock and mixed payment 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -1.62 +0.60 -0.83 +1.39 -2.32 -2.69 
% Positive CAAR 33.33 50.00 44.44 61.11 50.00 38.89 
Parametric test -0.43 +0.05 -0.09 +0.20 -0.18 -0.18 
Signed-rank test +1.79*** +0.54 +1.64 +0.82 +1.19 +1.21 
Rank-sum test +2.40** +1.04 +2.34** +1.34 +1.25 +1.54 
N = 18       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -1.51 -1.56 -0.87 -0.92 -4.29 -4.78 
% Positive CAAR 38.89 50.00 38.89 50.00 38.89 33.33 
Parametric test -0.42 -0.22 -0.09 -0.12 -0.30 -0.29 
Signed-rank test +1.48 +1.06 +1.62 +1.38 +1.47 +1.89*** 
Rank-sum test +2.15** +1.57 +2.47** +2.02** +1.66*** +2.14** 
N = 18       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -1.51 -1.57 -0.67 -0.74 -3.91 -3.81 
% Positive CAAR 33.33 44.44 38.89 38.89 44.44 44.44 
Parametric test  -0.44 -0.23 -0.07 -0.10 -0.31 -0.27 
Signed-rank test +1.65*** +1.28 +1.66*** +1.47 +1.12 +1.42 
Rank-sum test +2.62* +2.07** +2.74* +2.37** +1.72*** +2.24** 
N = 18       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -1.43 +0.38 -0.42 +1.38 -2.01 -1.80 
% Positive CAAR 27.78 55.56 50.00 61.11 50.00 33.33 
Parametric test  -0.43 +0.04 -0.05 +0.22 -0.17 -0.12 
Signed-rank test +1.79*** +0.70 +1.61 +0.87 +1.14 +0.96 
Rank-sum test +2.26** +1.16 +2.49** +1.45 +1.33 ++1.13 
N = 18       
Source: own calculations. The classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of all cash 
sample with other payments sample. 
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Appendix 15 – CAARs considering the target legal status 
A – Private target 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.64 +0.49 +0.01 -0.14 +0.21 -1.14 
% Positive CAAR 66.67 72.22 66.67 61.11 66.67 44.44 
Parametric test  +0.28 +0.20 0.00 -0.05 +0.06 -0.21 
Signed-rank test +1.52 +0.95 +0.78 +0.42 +0.34 +0.92 
N = 18       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.48 +0.45 +0.10 +0.07 +0.40 -1.06 
% Positive CAAR 61.11 66.67 66.67 61.11 61.11 33.33 
Parametric test  +0.21 +0.18 +0.03 +0.03 +0.12 -0.20 
Signed-rank test +1.31 +0.82 +0.81 +0.55 +0.39 +1.11 
N = 18       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.80 +0.74 +0.45 +0.39 +0.64 -0.70 
% Positive CAAR 61.11 72.22 72.22 66.67 72.22 38.89 
Parametric test  +0.32 +0.31 +0.14 +0.17 +0.23 -0.14 
Signed-rank test +1.57 +1.01 +1.30 +0.86 +0.73 +0.67 
N = 18       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) +0.59 +0.06 +0.32 -0.20 +0.21 -0.35 
% Positive CAAR 55.56 61.11 66.67 55.56 77.78 50.00 
Parametric test  +0.26 +0.02 +0.10 -0.05 +0.06 -0.06 
Signed-rank test +1.00 +0.45 +0.46 +0.09 +0.07 +0.71 
N = 18       
Source: own calculations. The classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test.  
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B – Public target 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -0.15 +0.18 -0.12 +0.21 -0.15 +0.64 
% Positive CAAR 45.45 24.45 21.82 29.09 21.82 18.18 
Parametric test -0.04 +0.04 -0.03 +0.04 -0.02 +0.08 
Signed-rank test +0.17 +0.66 +0.16 +0.76 +0.27 +0.07 
Rank-sum test +1.66*** +0.51 +0.64 +0.02 +0.39 +0.81 
N = 55       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.06 +0.09 -0.08 +0.07 -0.11 +0.57 
% Positive CAAR 53.70 53.70 50.00 64.81 51.85 51.85 
Parametric test -0.02 +0.02 -0.02 +0.01 -0.02 +0.08 
Signed-rank test +0.28 +0.15 +0.42 +0.32 +0.24 +0.30 
Rank-sum test +1.17 +0.65 +0.64 +0.36 +0.49 +0.90 
N = 54       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.11 +0.04 -0.05 +0.10 +0.12 +1.07 
% Positive CAAR 53.70 51.85 53.70 53.70 55.56 59.26 
Parametric test  -0.03 +0.01 -0.01 +0.02 +0.02 +0.15 
Signed-rank test +0.01 +0.01 +0.52 +0.37 +0.30 +0.41 
Rank-sum test +1.52 +0.87 +1.01 +0.62 +0.38 +0.84 
N = 54       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.16 +0.11 -0.09 +0.17 +0.02 +0.44 
% Positive CAAR 43.64 25.45 25.45 27.27 23.64 21.82 
Parametric test  -0.04 +0.02 -0.02 +0.03 +0.00 +0.05 
Signed-rank test +0.17 +0.59 +0.13 +0.69 +0.18 +0.17 
Rank-sum test +0.71 +0.08 +0.04 +0.36 +0.04 +0.63 
N = 55       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. 
The Rank-sum test compares the median of private and public targets samples. 
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Appendix 16 – CAARs considering the % of initial stake 
A – 0% initial stake 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -0.21 +0.37 -0.01 +0.58 -0.46 -0.50 
% Positive CAAR 45.24 59.52 51.19 64.29 54.76 48.81 
Parametric test  -0.06 +0.06 0.00 +0.12 -0.06 -0.06 
Signed-rank test +0.37 +0.47 +0.07 +0.68 +0.45 +1.08 
N = 84       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.13 -0.02 +0.10 +0.21 -0.62 -1.01 
% Positive CAAR 50.63 55.70 53.16 62.03 53.16 44.30 
Parametric test  -0.04 0.00 +0.02 +0.04 -0.08 -0.10 
Signed-rank test +0.05 +0.24 +0.62 +0.71 +0.19 +1.46 
N = 79       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.01 +0.10 +0.28 +0.39 -0.42 -0.46 
% Positive CAAR 48.10 55.70 58.23 55.70 55.70 48.10 
Parametric test  0.00 +0.02 +0.05 +0.08 -0.06 -0.05 
Signed-rank test +0.31 +0.30 +0.95 +0.83 +0.21 +0.68 
N = 79       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.24 +0.19 +0.03 +0.45 -0.37 -0.51 
% Positive CAAR 44.05 53.57 52.38 60.71 57.14 46.43 
Parametric test  -0.07 +0.03 0.00 +0.09 -0.05 -0.06 
Signed-rank test +0.58 +0.26 +0.21 +0.44 +0.32 +1.24 
N = 84       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test.  
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B – Initial stake > 0% 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.44 +0.43 +0.05 +0.04 -0.60 +0.75 
% Positive CAAR 72.73 68.18 59.09 59.09 54.55 59.09 
Parametric test +0.23 +0.14 +0.02 +0.01 -0.12 +0.12 
Signed-rank test +1.72*** +0.74 +0.55 +0.03 +0.69 +0.06 
Rank-sum test +1.65*** +0.39 +0.49 +0.31 +0.42 +0.60 
N = 22       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.25 +0.04 -0.12 -0.33 -0.95 +0.22 
% Positive CAAR 72.73 54.55 54.55 63.64 45.45 59.09 
Parametric test +0.15 +0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.19 +0.03 
Signed-rank test +1.46 +0.02 +0.64 +0.34 +0.74 +0.01 
Rank-sum test +0.93 +0.10 0.02 +0.64 +0.52 +0.74 
N = 22       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.26 -0.05 +0.18 -0.14 -0.44 +0.72 
% Positive CAAR 72.73 50.00 59.09 59.09 50.00 63.64 
Parametric test  +0.16 -0.02 +0.07 -0.04 -0.10 +0.12 
Signed-rank test +1.43 +0.39 +1.14 +0.29 +0.29 +0.39 
Rank-sum test +0.89 +0.40 +0.42 +0.59 +0.36 +0.61 
N = 22       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) +0.33 +0.11 +0.14 -0.08 -0.30 +0.46 
% Positive CAAR 63.64 68.18 59.09 59.09 54.55 59.09 
Parametric test  +0.18 +0.03 +0.06 -0.02 -0.05 +0.05 
Signed-rank test +1.46 +0.62 +0.71 +0.13 +0.27 +0.29 
Rank-sum test +1.47 +0.20 +0.62 +0.21 +0.10 +0.84 
N = 22       
Source: own calculations. The classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. The Rank-sum test compares the median of 
acquirers with and without initial stake. 
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Appendix 17 – CAARs considering the industry relatedness 
A – Focused acquisitions 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.03 +0.70 -0.09 +0.58 +0.10 +0.05 
% Positive CAAR 54.24 61.02 55.93 62.71 61.02 49.15 
Parametric test  +0.01 +0.11 -0.02 +0.12 +0.02 +0.01 
Signed-rank test +0.69 +0.56 +0.52 +0.44 +0.21 +0.77 
N = 59       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.09 +0.05 -0.10 -0.14 -0.35 -0.87 
% Positive CAAR 57.41 53.70 59.26 62.96 55.56 40.74 
Parametric test  +0.03 +0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 
Signed-rank test +1.07 +0.21 +1.07 +0.41 +0.04 +1.33 
N = 54       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.23 +0.16 +0.13 +0.06 -0.18 -0.49 
% Positive CAAR 53.70 53.70 62.96 57.41 59.26 44.44 
Parametric test  +0.07 +0.04 +0.03 +0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
Signed-rank test +1.36 +0.16 +1.56 +0.59 +0.24 +0.78 
N = 54       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.16 +0.18 -0.28 +0.06 +0.03 -0.55 
% Positive CAAR 45.76 52.54 55.93 59.32 61.02 44.07 
Parametric test  -0.05 +0.03 -0.07 +0.01 +0.00 -0.08 
Signed-rank test +0.01 +0.22 +0.15 +0.31 +0.26 +1.30 
N = 59       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test.  
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B – Diversified acquisitions 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -0.19 +0.07 +0.13 +0.39 -1.10 -0.46 
% Positive CAAR 45.45 63.64 50.91 63.64 47.27 52.73 
Parametric test -0.07 +0.02 +0.03 +0.09 -0.14 -0.05 
Signed-rank test +0.21 +0.69 +0.21 +0.51 +0.79 +0.34 
Rank-sum test +0.56 +0.13 +0.42 +0.11 +0.44 +0.23 
N = 55       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.21 -0.05 +0.20 +0.36 -0.95 -0.36 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 59.26 48.15 62.96 48.15 53.70 
Parametric test -0.08 -0.01 +0.04 +0.09 -0.13 -0.04 
Signed-rank test +0.39 +0.16 +0.19 +0.23 +0.58 +0.26 
Rank-sum test +1.02 0.00 +0.84 +0.10 +0.40 +0.70 
N = 54       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.16 -0.03 +0.40 +0.54 -0.59 +0.31 
% Positive CAAR 51.85 57.41 55.56 57.41 50.00 59.26 
Parametric test  -0.06 -0.01 +0.08 +0.13 -0.09 +0.04 
Signed-rank test +0.15 +0.13 +0.32 +0.48 +0.09 +0.55 
Rank-sum test +1.20 +0.08 +0.85 +0.10 +0.10 +0.85 
N = 54       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.10 +0.13 +0.40 +0.62 -0.79 +0.04 
% Positive CAAR 49.09 61.82 52.73 61.82 50.91 54.55 
Parametric test  -0.04 +0.03 +0.08 +0.14 -0.10 0.00 
Signed-rank test +0.13 +0.89 +0.10 +0.88 +0.42 +0.10 
Rank-sum test +0.07 +0.84 +0.07 +0.90 +0.15 +0.92 
N = 55       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999.  The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. 
The Rank-sum test compares the median of acquirers that made diversified and focused acquisitions.  
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Appendix 18 – CAARs considering cultural differences in cross-border bids 
A – High cultural differences 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) -0.49 +0.29 -0.32 +0.46 -2.19 -2.76 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 55.88 55.88 64.71 50.00 44.12 
Parametric test  -0.10 +0.03 -0.04 +0.06 -0.23 -0.26 
Signed-rank test +0.19 +0.02 +0.13 +0.01 +1.02 +1.24 
N = 34       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.53 -1.02 -0.14 -0.62 -2.83 -3.92 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 56.67 63.33 63.33 46.67 43.33 
Parametric test  -0.11 -0.14 -0.02 -0.08 -0.25 -0.30 
Signed-rank test +0.06 +0.40 +0.67 +0.13 +0.54 +1.47 
N = 30       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) -0.27 -0.78 +0.29 -0.23 -2.48 -3.03 
% Positive CAAR 50.00 56.67 70.00 60.00 60.00 46.67 
Parametric test  -0.05 -0.11 +0.04 -0.03 -0.24 -0.26 
Signed-rank test +0.45 +0.33 +1.14 +0.31 +0.20 +0.71 
N = 30       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) -0.56 -0.07 -0.32 +0.17 -2.02 -2.72 
% Positive CAAR 41.18 55.88 50.00 58.82 47.06 44.12 
Parametric test  -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 +0.02 -0.23 -0.26 
Signed-rank test +0.26 +0.28 +0.35 +0.34 +0.90 +1.34 
N = 34       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999. The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test.  
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B – Low cultural differences 
 Event Window 
 Day 0 [0, +1] [-1, 0] [-1, +1] [-5, +1] [-5, +5] 
MM       
MSCI World       
CAAR (%) +0.02 +0.74 +0.08 +0.80 +0.23 +0.30 
% Positive CAAR 51.35 72.97 51.35 70.27 56.76 51.35 
Parametric test +0.01 +0.34 +0.03 +0.30 +0.07 +0.07 
Signed-rank test +0.03 +1.53 +0.08 +1.16 +0.23 +0.35 
Rank-sum test +0.34 +0.85 +0.26 +0.62 +0.42 +0.99 
N = 37       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.23 +0.74 +0.10 +0.61 +0.20 +0.16 
% Positive CAAR 60.00 60.00 48.57 65.71 48.57 42.86 
Parametric test -0.08 -0.01 +0.04 +0.09 -0.13 -0.04 
Signed-rank test +0.96 +1.44 +0.24 +0.83 +0.13 +0.43 
Rank-sum test +0.11 +1.22 +0.73 +0.26 +0.67 +1.31 
N = 35       
MAM       
MSCI Europe       
CAAR (%) +0.31 +0.76 +0.24 +0.69 +0.58 +0.64 
% Positive CAAR 62.86 60.00 54.29 54.29 51.43 51.43 
Parametric test  +0.25 +0.39 +0.12 +0.30 +0.19 +0.13 
Signed-rank test +1.24 +1.52 +0.59 +1.01 +0.81 +0.19 
Rank-sum test +0.07 +1.15 +0.95 +0.12 +0.62 +0.87 
N = 35       
CMRM       
CAAR (%) +0.15 +0.63 +0.23 +0.71 +0.28 -0.32 
% Positive CAAR 54.05 59.46 62.16 64.86 62.16 51.35 
Parametric test  +0.08 +0.21 +0.07 +0.18 +0.07 -0.06 
Signed-rank test +0.68 +1.21 +0.39 +0.88 +0.22 +0.84 
Rank-sum test +0.60 +0.95 +0.58 +0.88 +0.98 +0.79 
N = 37       
Source: own calculations. The MSCI Europe Index is only available after 1999.  The classification *, **, 
***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for a two-tailed t-student test. 
The Rank-sum test compares the median of acquirers that have low and high cultural differences with the 
Portuguese targets. 
